Cleveland State Law Review
Volume 57

Issue 3

Article

2009

A Moving Bar Approach to Assessing the Admissibility of Expert
Causation Testimony
Aaron Katz
Ropes & Gray, L.L.P.

Follow this and additional works at: https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev
Part of the Evidence Commons

How does access to this work benefit you? Let us know!
Recommended Citation
Aaron Katz, A Moving Bar Approach to Assessing the Admissibility of Expert Causation Testimony, 57
Clev. St. L. Rev. 579 (2009)
available at https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/7

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at EngagedScholarship@CSU. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Cleveland State Law Review by an authorized editor of EngagedScholarship@CSU. For
more information, please contact library.es@csuohio.edu.

A “MOVING BAR” APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE
ADMISSIBILITY OF EXPERT CAUSATION TESTIMONY
AARON KATZ*

I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT VOSBURG V. PUTNEY
CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE MODERN LAW OF
EXPERT EVIDENCE ............................................................... 580
II. THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND LAW:
THE DAUBERT AND GENERAL ELECTRIC V. JOINER
DECISIONS ........................................................................... 585
A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. ........... 585
B. General Electric v. Joiner ............................................ 588
C. Linking Evidentiary Reliability to Scientific
Validity: A Static Bar Approach to Admissibility ........ 594
III. A MOVING BAR APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE
RELIABILITY OF EXPERT CAUSATION TESTIMONY ............... 601
A. The Traditional Role of Policy in Helping to
Resolve Uncertain Questions of Causation ................. 601
B. Beyond a Static Bar Approach to Assessing
Reliability..................................................................... 606
IV. THE MOVING BAR APPROACH IN ACTION ............................ 608
A. Intentional Torts .......................................................... 608
B. Cases Involving Knowing Violations of Criminal
or Regulatory Provisions that Possibly have
Resulted in Unintended Injuries to Unintended
Victims ......................................................................... 612
C. Cases Involving Injuries Possibly Causally
Connected to Consumer Products that Possess
Questionable Social Utility.......................................... 617
V. CONCLUSION: SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE MOVING
BAR APPROACH ................................................................... 622

*

Associate, Ropes & Gray LLP; J.D. (magna cum laude), Harvard, 2004; B.A. (summa
cum laude), University of San Francisco, 2001. Mr. Katz wishes to thank Robert Jackson,
Bryan Killian, Randy Kozel, Geoffrey Wyatt, and all of his other former Harvard Law Review
colleagues for engaging in various discussions that substantially improved this Article. Mr.
Katz also wishes to give separate thanks to Professors Jennifer Mnookin and Brian Weiner, as
well as Dean Anne-Marie Slaughter, without whose support this Article would not have been
possible.

579

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

1

580

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:579

I. INTRODUCTION: WHAT VOSBURG V. PUTNEY CAN TEACH US ABOUT THE MODERN
LAW OF EXPERT EVIDENCE
Virtually every first year American law student learns the case of Vosburg v.
Putney.1 As one commentator has put it, “Vosburg v. Putney has, upon years of
dedicated service in many capacities, achieved within the realm of torts a distinction
it shares with a small circle of other Anglo-American cases . . . .”2 It is hardly
surprising that Vosburg has become perhaps one of the most celebrated tort cases in
American law: Wrapped within its elegantly simple fact pattern3 are fundamental
questions of intent, comparative negligence, and proximate causation.4
What is arguably surprising, however, is that Vosburg has been taught
exclusively as a “torts” case, with little to no attention having been paid to the case’s
profound lessons on the relationship between “substantive” tort law and the
“procedural” law of expert evidence. After all, the Vosburg jury was not left
unassisted in determining whether the defendant’s “slight” kick to the shin of the
plaintiff was the cause-in-fact of the plaintiff’s debilitating bone injury. Rather, at
trial the jury heard significant expert testimony on the causation-in-fact question. On
the one hand, the plaintiff introduced the testimony of Doctors Joshua Bacon and
Hugo Philler, the plaintiff’s treating physicians. Each testified that, in their expert
medical opinion, the “exciting cause of [the bone destruction] was the application of
some force (a kick or a blow) to [the plaintiff’s] leg.”5 Specifically, Dr. Philler
testified that, although the plaintiff’s “medical history indicated heightened
susceptibility to infectious diseases,” he “had spotted nothing to persuade him that
1
Vosburg v. Putney, 56 N.W. 480 (Wis. 1893) (holding that defendant, who lightly but
intentionally kicked a fellow student on the shin, was fully liable for the unforeseeable bone
destruction resulting from the kick). At Harvard Law School, Vosburg was the first case I was
assigned to read in my first-year Torts class.
2
See Zigurds L. Zile, Vosburg v. Putney: A Centennial Story, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 877, 988
(1992).
3

The facts of Vosburg are as follows:
The plaintiff was about 14 years of age, and the defendant about 11 years of age. On
[February 20, 1889], they were sitting opposite to each other across an aisle in the high
school of . . . Waukesha. The defendant reached across the aisle with his foot, and hit
with his toe the shin of the right leg of the plaintiff. The touch was slight. The
plaintiff did not feel it . . . . In a few moments he felt a violent pain in [his right shin],
which caused him to cry out loudly. The next day he was sick and had to be helped to
school. On the fourth day [after,] he was vomiting . . . . There was a slight
discoloration of the skin entirely over the inner surface of the tibia an inch below the
bend of the knee. . . . [O]n the 8th of March an operation was performed on the limb
by making an incision, and a moderate amount of pus escaped. . . . On the sixth day
after this, another incision was made to the bone, and it was found that destruction was
going on in the bone, and so it has continued exfoliating pieces of bone. [The
plaintiff] will never recover the use of the limb. There were black and blue spots on
the shin bone, indicating that there had been a blow.
Vosburg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99, 99 (Wis. 1890).
4

See, e.g., Robert Rabin, Preface Vosburg v. Putney in Three-Part Disharmony, 1992
WIS. L. REV. 863, 864-65 (1992) (“What better introduction to the subtleties of tort law?”).
5

Zile, supra note 2, at 959.
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[the plaintiff] would have developed osteomyelitis whether or not force had been
applied” to the plaintiff’s leg.6 Dr. Philler concluded that the plaintiff’s bone
“disease began as osteomyelitis . . . within the bone marrow” and that although “the
infectious material traveled to the tibia from the inadequately treated and poorly
healing wound above the knee” sustained in an earlier accident involving an axe,
“‘such disastrous results should [not] have occurred without a secondary
traumatism.’”7 On the other hand, the defendant introduced at least four medical
experts in rebuttal, who collectively testified that although “[s]ome cause was
necessary to localize osteomyelitis,” bone growth “was the most common cause.”8
It is hard to say definitively whether a relatively light kick to the shin could have
been9 the “exciting cause” of young Vosburg’s “localized osteomyelitis” of the tibia.
But, this is beside the point. Modern evidentiary standards do not allow the
admission of a causation-in-fact expert whenever there is a non-zero possibility that
the expert’s opinion is correct. In other words, the question is not whether the expert
has established a non-zero possibility of a causal connection between the defendant’s
act and the plaintiff’s injury.10 Rather, the relevant question is whether the testimony
of the expert is sufficiently “reliable” to warrant admission to the jury.
The opinions of Drs. Bacon and Philler were based on the “germ or microbe
theory of disease,” which hypothesized that all bone inflammation and disease was
caused by the presence of pus-forming germs that needed an “exciting cause” of
some sort to grow and become harmful in the body.11 At the turn of the twentieth
century, germ theory was “still but grudgingly received by American medical
science.”12 Moreover, neither Drs. Bacon nor Philler were able to cite to any studies
6

Id. at 960.

7

Id.

8

Id. at 961.

9

The qualifying phrase “could be” sounds in terms of “general causation.” See, e.g., In re
Hanford Nuclear Reservation Litig., 292 F.3d 1124, 1133 (9th Cir. 2002) (explaining that
general causation refers to “whether the substance at issue had the capacity to cause the harm
alleged, while ‘individual causation’ refers to whether a particular individual suffers from a
particular ailment as a result of exposure to a substance”).
10

If an expert can reliability testify only to a possibility of a causal connection, then it will
be excluded as failing the second prong, or “fit” requirement, of the Rule 702 analysis. See,
e.g., Hall v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 947 F. Supp. 1387, 1398 (D. Or. 1996) (“[T]he plaintiffs
in this litigation must prove not merely the possibility of a causal connection between breast
implants and the alleged systemic disease, but the medical probability of a causal connection.
Under this substantive standard, if an expert cannot state the causal connection in terms of
probability or certainty, the expert’s testimony must be excluded under the second prong of
Rule 702.”). Professor Berger has previously remarked on this phenomenon of incorporating
sufficiency of the evidence standards directly into the admissibility inquiry. See Margaret A.
Berger, Upsetting the Balance Between Adverse Interests: The Impact of the Supreme Court’s
Trilogy on Expert Testimony in Toxic Tort Litigation, 64 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 289, 32325 (2001) [hereinafter Berger, Upsetting the Balance].
11
Zile, supra note 2, at 912. Doctors Bacon and Philler appeared to believe that virtually
anything could be an “exciting cause”—for example, a physical blow, exposure to cold or
dampness, malnutrition, or overexertion. See id. at 913.
12

Id. at 912.
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or experiments tending to show that a light blow could cause a rapid destruction of
bone, even a bone left vulnerable by a latent bacterial infection. Indeed even today,
the relationship between trauma and bacterial induced bone deterioration is not well
known.13
All of this considered, it is likely that, if Vosburg occurred today, a trial court
applying the so-called “Dabuert standard”—the prevailing standard for the
admission of expert evidence in federal court and the courts of a majority of the
states14—would find that the opinions of Drs. Bacon and Philler were not based upon
a reliable methodology and, accordingly, would be inadmissible.15
Of course, the Vosburg case was litigated over one hundred years prior to the
Supreme Court’s opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals—and
preceded even Frye v. United States16 by over thirty years. Without strict
admissibility standards for expert evidence yet in place, the Wisconsin Supreme
Court offered a terse response to the defendant’s challenge to the admissibility of the
opinions of Drs. Bacon and Philler:
The only remaining assignment of error is that the court erred in
permitting medical witness to give their opinions as to what was the
exciting cause of the injury to Andrew [Vosburg]. We think that it was a
proper subject for expert testimony, and hence that the error is not well
assigned.17
Indeed, earlier in the litigation, in an opinion reversing a verdict in favor of Vosburg
on other grounds, the Wisconsin Supreme Court offered a similar view:
It is a very strange and extraordinary case. The [kick] would seem to be
very slight for so great and serious a consequence [as occurred]. And yet
13
See Raymond T. Morrissy & Darrel W. Haynes, Acute Hematogenous Osteomyelitis: A
Model With Trauma as an Etiology, 9 J. OF PEDIATRIC ORTHOPAEDICS 447, 455 (1989).
14

See, e.g., Chief Justice Thomas J. Moyer & Stephen P. Anway, Biotechnology and the
Bar: A Response to the Growing Divide Between Science and the Legal Environment, 22
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 671, 715 (2007) (recognizing that “[m]ost state courts have adopted the
Daubert standard to determine the admissibility of scientific evidence . . . .”).
15

See generally Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579 (1993). The Wisconsin
Supreme Court recently noted that it has not yet adopted the Daubert standard (which governs
in federal court) as the governing standard in its own state courts. See Conley Publ’g Group
Ltd. v. Journal Commc’ns, Inc., 665 N.W.2d 879, 892-93 (Wis. 2003); see also Green v.
Smith & Nephew AHP, Inc., 617 N.W.2d 881, 890-91 (Wis. Ct. App. 2000) (holding that
“[u]nder Wisconsin law, scientific testimony is admissible if it is an aid to the jury or reliable
enough to be probative,” though explaining that “[a]n opinion for which there is no proper
foundation . . . is not reliable enough to be probative” (internal quotation marks omitted)); see
also Andrew R. Stolfi, Why Illinois Should Abandon Frye’s General Acceptance Standard for
the Admission of Novel Scientific Evidence, 78 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 861, 898 n.225 (2003)
(noting that forty-five states have codified the federal Rule 702 or its equivalent).
16

Frye v. United States, 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923) (holding that expert evidence is
admissible only if based on a methodology that has “gained general acceptance” in the
relevant scientific community), overruled in part by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509
U.S. 579 (1993).
17

Vosburg v. Putney, 56 N.W. 480, 480 (Wis. 1893).
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the plaintiff’s limb might have been in just that condition when such a
slight blow would excite and cause such a result, according to the medical
testimony. That there is great uncertainty about the case cannot be denied.
But perfect certainty is not required. It is sufficient that it is the opinion
of the expert medical witnesses that such a [kick] might produce such a
result under peculiar circumstances, and that the jury had a right to find . .
. that it did.18
The premise of the passage above is that the reliability of an expert’s opinion is
not for the court to decide, even as a threshold matter. Though that premise was
consistent with the then-prevailing law, it is radically inconsistent with the modern
jurisprudence of expert evidence and, in particular, Daubert. And this leads to an
important insight: If Vosburg were litigated today, there might well be no Vosburg.
The causation proffers of Drs. Bacon and Philler would be deemed inadmissible, and
the trial court would accordingly grant Putney’s motion for summary judgment.19
A modern scholar might regard the jury’s verdict in Vosburg as proof that the
combination of “junk science” and a sympathetic plaintiff is a powerful elixir. Why
then is Vosburg not viewed as a paradigmatic example of the importance of a court’s
gatekeeping role with respect to expert evidence? One answer, to be sure, is that the
admissibility issue in Vosburg is an anomaly of history, a result of an anachronistic
legal regime that gave juries carte blanche to distinguish good science from bad.
But, the better answer is that the verdict in Vosburg is regarded as “right”—not so
much because it represents a factually correct determination of what actually caused
Vosburg’s catastrophic injury, but rather because it represents a socially acceptable
outcome between the parties: Putney acted as a social deviant and therefore has no
real basis to complain about being held liable for Vosburg’s injury. Because the
outcome of the case is regarded as “right”—the term “rough justice” comes to
mind—one scarcely pays attention to the fact that Vosburg’s case rested on dubious
expert opinions.
The lesson that might be drawn is this: The greater the perceived reprehensibility
of the defendant’s conduct, the less the legal system hesitates to allow the jury to
speculate regarding causation-in-fact.20 In the Vosburg case, despite a strong
intuition that a light kick simply could not have caused such a seriously destructive
bone injury, one is not all that uncomfortable with the jury’s verdict—or, more
accurately, the trial court’s decision to allow the jury reach that verdict because (1)
there was evidence that Putney’s conduct was morally depraved—that is to say,
devoid of any social benefit and ostensibly taken only to harass and annoy Vosburg;
18

See Vosburg v. Putney, 47 N.W. 99, 99 (Wis. 1890).

19

See JoEllen Lind, “Procedural Swift”: Complex Litigation Reform, State Tort Law, and
Democratic Values, 37 AKRON L. REV. 717, 772-73 (2004) (“It has become commonplace for
federal courts to conduct a ‘Daubert hearing’ to test the admissibility of plaintiffs’ crucial
expert opinions early on in litigation; when the evidence is ruled inadmissible . . . a successful
defense motion for summary judgment typically follows.”).
20
See Robert Cooter, Torts as the Union of Liberty and Efficiency: An Essay on
Causation, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 523, 524 (1987). As Professor Cooter writes, “Causation in
tort law is, thus, a way of describing the point where personal freedom runs out and
responsibility to others begins . . . . Deciding issues of causation in tort law requires an appeal
to substantive values like liberty and efficiency.” Id.
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and (2) there was at least a non-zero possibility that the Putney’s unlawful act was
the cause-in-fact of the Vosburg’s injury.21
The jury’s speculation, based only on dubious expert testimony, that Putney’s
kick caused Vosburg’s injury does not draw objection because it is consistent with
Professor Malone’s classic observation that where the defendant has violated an
“exacting” rule of law that rests on “time-honored moral considerations,” he “will be
held responsible for any harm that can be causally associated in any plausible way
with his wrongdoing.”22 Malone observed that in such circumstances, “[t]he court . .
. will seldom hesitate to allow the jury a free range of speculation on the cause issue
at the expense of an intentional wrongdoer who is charged with having physically
injured another person.”23 Moreover, to the extent that Putney’s behavior served no
ascertainable social utility,24 allowing the jury to impose liability on Putney is
consistent with legal economists’ view of the causation-in-fact element.25
And, yet, Vosburg arguably is inconsistent with the current majority standard for
the admissibility of expert evidence. Under that standard, a trial court would exclude
the type of novel, speculative causation-in-fact testimony that Vosburg’s experts
proffered, which would ultimately lead to summary judgment being granted in favor
of the defendant.26
This Article argues that the Supreme Court’s decisions in Daubert and Joiner
imply an approach to the reliability, and hence admissibility, of causation experts

21

See Christopher H. Schroeder, Rights Against Risks, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 495, 500 (1986)
(recognizing that if there is a non-zero possibility that A can cause B, if A is sufficiently
repeated, eventually it will in fact cause B). The more unlawful the defendant’s conduct, the
more we are willing to assume that such conduct is empty of any social benefit. Indeed, if
there is a non-zero possibility that the defendant’s conduct actually caused the plaintiff’s
injury, that conduct is per se Pareto inefficient unless there is no ascertainable social benefit to
the defendant’s conduct. One who is of the view that the goal of tort law is to promote social
efficiency should conclude that, all other things equal, it is better to over- rather than underdeter conduct that serves no social benefit and that, accordingly, the causation-in-fact
“burden” should be significantly relaxed in such circumstances.
22

Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60, 72-73 (1956).

23

Id. at 72-73.

24

See RICHARD A. POSNER, TORT LAW: CASES AND ECONOMIC ANALYSIS 27 (1982)
(“Perhaps [Vosburg] should have worn a shinguard. But . . . the costs of the shinguard must
be compared with the cost to [Putney] of not kicking [Vosburg.] The latter cost was
presumably low—even negative.”).
25
Cooter, supra note 20, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. at 540 (“In this tradition, if efficiency
requires holding the defendant liable, he is said to have caused the accident, but not otherwise
. . . . ‘Cause’ is reduced to ‘efficiency’ in the sense that the ascription of legal cause is wholly
dependent upon the judgment of economic efficiency . . . . Saying the defendant caused the
accident means . . . that [economic] efficiency requires holding him liable.”).
26

The Daubert standard, which has essentially been codified in Federal Rule of Evidence
702 as amended in 2000, has been adopted by approximately thirty states, although the “exact
number is difficult to determine.” Cara Gitlin, Note, Expert Testimony on Child Sexual Abuse
Accommodation Syndrome, 26 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 497, 503 n.45 (2008). For the sake of
simplicity, for the remainder of this paper, I treat Daubert as setting forth the applicable
analysis for expert admissibility.
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that conflicts with the way in which courts traditionally had determined whether to
allow the jury to speculate on uncertain causation-in-fact questions. Largely moving
past the debate of whether Daubert and Joiner set the admissibility bar too high or
low, the Article instead criticizes the decisions on the ground that they suggest that
the height of the reliability bar is static and should not be adjusted depending upon
the circumstances of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct. Under the “all-ornothing” liability rule, the exclusion of a plaintiff’s expert causation evidence will
necessarily result in under-deterrence. Conversely, the admission of a plaintiff’s
questionable expert will necessarily expose a defendant to potential liability for harm
that, from a probabilistic perspective, it did not cause. This Article thus critiques the
static bar approach from a deterrence perspective and argues that the nature of the
defendant’s conduct should be a factor in a court’s determination of whether a
plaintiff’s causation expert’s proffer is sufficiently reliable to warrant admission at
trial.
Part II reviews the Supreme Court’s decision in Daubert and its subsequent
decision in General Electric Co. v. Joiner.27 By linking “evidentiary reliability” with
scientific validity, the Court’s opinions in those cases imply a “static bar approach”
to admissibility.28 Part III proposes that, instead of a static reliability bar, a “moving
bar approach” allowing the court to adjust the height of the reliability bar in response
to the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct would be more consistent with tort
law’s traditional treatment of causation-in-fact and more likely to achieve
economically efficient deterrence. Part IV discusses some paradigmatic cases in
which a moving bar approach might alter admissibility outcomes. Part V offers and
responds to several potential objections to the moving bar approach.
II. THE INTERSECTION OF SCIENCE AND LAW: THE DAUBERT AND
GENERAL ELECTRIC V. JOINER DECISIONS
In this section, the author discusses the Supreme Court’s seminal decision in
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc. and its subsequent opinion in
General Electric v. Joiner. The author argues that by linking admissibility with the
concept of scientific validity, these decisions suggest that the degree of reliability
that must be demonstrated of a causation expert’s proffer is not case specific.
Rather, the height of the reliability bar is “static.”
A. Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.
Between 1957 and 1983, approximately thirty million pregnant women were
prescribed Merrell Dow’s drug Bendectin to relieve symptoms of morning sickness,
including nausea and vomiting.29 In the mid-1970s, there arose anecdotal-based
27

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

28

Perhaps the simplest way to explain what I mean by “static reliability threshold” is to
imagine that any expert opinion is given a reliability score that is measured in terms of
scientific validity. When the reliability threshold is static, the reliability score that is required
of any expert remains the same from case to case, regardless of the underlying facts or the
nature of the suit. Professor Imwinkelried has used the phrases “invariant reliability
threshold” and “uniform, minimum reliability level” to describe this. Edward J. Imwinkelried,
The Relativity of Reliability, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 269, 269 (2003).
29

Merrell Dow Pharms. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 708 (Tex. 1997).
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concerns of a link between Bendectin and birth defects. Although more than thirty
scientific studies had failed to demonstrate any such link, and although the FDA
never revoked its approval of Bendectin, a rash of products liability suits ensued
against Merrell Dow. “In virtually all the Bendectin litigation, the central issue [had]
been the scientific reliability of the expert testimony offered to establish causation.”30
It was against this backdrop that the Supreme Court rendered its decision in Daubert
v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals. Jason Daubert and Eric Schuller were born with
serious birth defects. Each of their mothers had used Bendectin during her first
trimester of each pregnancy. Jason, Eric, and their parents filed a products liability
suit in federal court against Merrell Dow alleging that Bendectin had caused their
birth defects.31 “After extensive discovery, [Merrell Dow] moved for summary
judgment, contending that Bendectin [did] not cause birth defects in humans and that
[Daubert and Schuller were] unable to come forward with any admissible evidence
that it [did].”32 Merrell Dow’s expert, a physician and credentialed epidemiologist
named Dr. Steven Lamm, testified that over thirty studies had found Bendectin to
pose no risk of birth defects and that no study had ever found Bendectin to be a
human terotagen.33
Daubert and Schuller did not contest Merrell Dow’s experts’ “characterization of
the published record regarding Bendectin. Instead, they responded . . . with the
testimony of eight experts of their own, each of whom also possessed impressive
credentials.”34 Based upon animal studies, chemical analyses, and re-analyses of
previous human subject Bendectin studies, these experts had “concluded that
Bendectin can cause birth defects.”35
Over the plaintiffs’ objections, the district court excluded their experts’ proposed
testimony, holding that the experts’ opinions were based upon analyses that had not
been published or peer reviewed, thus precluding their admission under Federal Rule
of Evidence 702.36 The Ninth Circuit affirmed on the same grounds.37
In a unanimous opinion, the Supreme Court vacated the decision below. The
Court held that “[n]othing in the text of [Rule 702] establishes ‘general acceptance’
as an absolute prerequisite to admissibility.”38 Indeed, the Court explained that such
a prerequisite “would be at odds with the ‘liberal thrust’ of the Federal Rules and

30
Id. The cost of defending the suits ultimately became so burdensome that Merrell Dow
voluntarily withdrew Bendectin from the market in 1983. Id.
31

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 509 U.S. 579, 582 (1993).

32

Id.

33

Id.

34

Id. at 584.

35

Id. at 583.

36

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 727 F. Supp. 570, 576 (S.D. Cal. 1989).

37

See Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharms., 951 F.2d 1128, 1131 (9th Cir. 1991). The Ninth
Circuit added that, because the plaintiffs’ experts’ testimony had been prepared “solely for
litigation,” it would be scrutinized especially heavily. See id.
38

See Daubert, 509 U.S. at 587.
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their ‘general approach of relaxing the traditional barriers to ‘opinion’ testimony.”39
The Court held that Rule 702 requires only that “scientific testimony or evidence . . .
[be] relevant [and] reliable.”40 Still, although the district court had erred in imposing
a general acceptance prerequisite, the Court made it clear that district judges must
continue to act as gate keepers to ensure that all “scientific testimony” be “derived
by the scientific method.”41
In articulating the contours of Rule 702’s general reliability standard, the Court
stated that the inquiry should be “a flexible one,” and it set out a non-exhaustive list
of non-dispositive indicia of reliability: (1) whether the expert’s conclusion is
generally falsifiable through empirical testing; (2) whether the studies upon which
the expert’s opinion is based have been subjected to peer review; (3) whether the
testing upon which the expert’s opinion is based has a low error rate; and (4) whether
the expert’s conclusions have received general acceptance within the relevant
scientific community.42
Although Daubert superficially appeared to “relax the ‘austere standard’ of the
older Frye rule,”43 there was immediate disagreement amongst commentators about
“whether [the opinion] st[ood] for a liberal standard of admissibility or a
conservative one.”44 Fifteen years later, there is some indication that “Daubert has
made it harder, not easier, to get scientific testimony admitted.”45 In hindsight, at
least one element of the Daubert opinion portended this outcome: the Court’s
linkage of evidentiary reliability—the polestar for admissibility—with the concept of
scientific validity. The Court stated that the “overarching subject” of the Rule 702
admissibility inquiry “is the scientific validity—and thus the evidentiary relevance
and reliability—of the principles that underlie a proposed [expert] submission”46 and
that “[i]n a case involving scientific evidence, evidentiary reliability will be based
upon scientific validity.”47
39

Id. (quoting Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Rainey, 488 U.S. 153, 169 (1988)).

40

Id. at 589.

41

Id. at 590. “That the Frye test was displaced by the Rules of Evidence does not mean,
however, that the Rules themselves place no limits on the admissibility of purportedly
scientific evidence . . . . [T]he trial judge must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or
evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable.” Id. at 589.
42

See id. at 591-94.

43

Susan Haack, Of Truth, in Science and in Law, 73 BROOK. L. REV. 985, 990 (2008).

44
David L. Faigman, Elise Porter & Michael J. Saks, Check Your Crystal Ball at the
Courthouse Door, Please: Exploring the Past, Understanding the Present, and Worrying
About the Future of Scientific Evidence, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1799, 1819 (1994).
45
Haack, supra note 43, at 990; see also David L. Faigman et al., How Good is Good
Enough? Expert Evidence Under Daubert and Kumho, 50 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 645, 656
(2000) (“[T]he move from Frye to Daubert . . . raised the height of the admissibility bar . . . in
a more complex way than is often appreciated by courts or commentators.”).
46

Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594-95.

47

Id. at 590 n.9 (emphasis in original); see also Robert J. Goodwin, The Hidden
Significance of Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael: A Compass for Problems of Definition and
Procedure Created by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 52 BAYLOR L. REV. 603,
612 (2000) (“Daubert equates ‘evidentiary reliability’ with ‘scientific validity.’”). Although
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Regardless of whether it was the Court’s actual intent, the passages imply an
attempt to “incorporate[] into law a scientific attitude toward selecting scientific
testimony” 48 and a “move toward a ‘more scientific approach to admissibility.’”49 In
Professor Feldman’s view, “the Daubert Court adopted an approach to determining
the admissibility of scientific opinion that reflects scientists’ own approach to
deciding which information to consider when deciding questions of scientific fact.” 50
B. General Electric v. Joiner
In the short time after the Supreme Court issued its Daubert opinion, it remained
unclear how deep a change it would work into the law of expert evidence. At the
same time, one commentator called Daubert “the most important case involving the
admissibility of scientific evidence in seventy years.”51 One court took the view that
“Daubert only prescribe[d] judicial intervention for expert testimony approaching
the outer boundaries of traditional scientific and technological knowledge.”52
Professor Joseph Sanders might best have summed up the alternative available
interpretations of Daubert: “From a narrow perspective, Daubert simply resolved a
longstanding issue in the law of evidence by holding that the Federal Rules of
Evidence superseded Frye. From a wider perspective, the opinion represents an
attempt to define, or perhaps redefine, the relationship between science and the
law.”53
In 1997, the Supreme Court’s opinion in General Electric Co. v. Joiner54 began
to resolve some of these debates, as well as determine the viability of Daubert’s
putative “dichotomy between methodology and conclusions.”55
Robert Joiner began working as an electrician for the city of Thomasville,
Georgia in 1973. “This job required him to work with and around the city’s
the Court assured that it would be “unreasonable” to require that “the subject of [an expert’s]
scientific testimony must be ‘known’ to a certainty” in order to be admissible, this was only
because “there are no certainties in science.” Daubert, 509 U.S. at 590.
48

Heidi Li Feldman, Science and Uncertainty in Mass Exposure Litigation, 74 TEX. L.
REV. 1, 2 (1995).
49

Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of Science
Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 804 (1997)
(quoting Feldman, supra note 48, at 1-2).
50

Feldman, supra note 48, at 2.

51
David E. Bernstein, The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell
Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 2139, 2139 (1994).
52

Lappe v. Am. Honda Motor Co., 857 F. Supp. 222, 228 (N.D.N.Y. 1994) (stating that
Daubert applied only in cases of “novel scientific evidence”) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579).
53
Joseph Sanders, Scientific Validity, Admissibility, and Mass Torts After Daubert, 78
MINN. L. REV. 1387, 1440 (1994) (“By placing the concept of scientific validity at the center
of admissibility decisions, Daubert invoked scientific understandings of what constitutes good
and bad science.”).
54

General Electric Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136 (1997).

55

D. Michael Risinger et al., The Daubert/Kumho Implications of Observer Effects in
Forensic Science: Hidden Problems of Expectation and Suggestion, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1, 5 n.12
(2002).
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electrical transformers, which used a mineral-oil-based dielectric fluid as a coolant.
Joiner often had to stick his hands and arms into the fluid to make repairs,” and the
fluid would “sometimes splash onto him, occasionally getting into his eyes and
mouth.”56 “In 1983, the city discovered that the fluid in some of the transformers
was contaminated with polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs),”57 which by then had been
“widely considered to be hazardous to human health” for nearly a decade.58
In 1991, at the age of 37, Joiner was diagnosed with small cell lung cancer.59
Joiner filed a lawsuit against General Electric Co., alleging that (1) General Electric
had manufactured the PCBs that Joiner consistently had come into contact with
during his years as an electrician; and (2) such exposure had “promoted” his cancer,
which, but for his exposure to the PCBs, “would not have developed for many years,
if at all.”60 One of Joiner’s experts, Dr. Arthur Frank, testified that
[i]t [was] more likely than not, given Mr. Joiner’s limited tobacco use, and
also considering his second hand tobacco smoke exposure, and given his
age at the onset of lung cancer, 37 years, that tobacco smoke served only
as the initiator of the cancer and that some other agent served as the
promoter of the initiated cells. It was the promotion of these initiated
cells which caused Mr. Joiner to be harmed.61
Another one of his experts, Dr. Arnold Schecter, stated that Joiner’s cancer “was
causally linked to cigarette smoking and PCB exposure,” including exposure to
“dioxins and dibenzofurans and related chemicals which frequently are found
together in transformer fluids.”62 Joiner’s expert, Dr. Daniel Teitelbaum, likewise
testified that Joiner’s “lung cancer was caused by or contributed to in a significant
degree by the materials with which he worked.”63
General Electric challenged the admissibility of Joiner’s experts’ opinions that
PCBs were capable of causing small cell lung cancer in humans, arguing inter alia
that “there are no epidemiological studies which show that PCBs cause small cell
lung cancer in humans” and that Joiner’s experts’ “reliance on [mice] studies” for
their conclusions was unjustifiable.64 The district court found General Electric’s
second argument persuasive, finding Joiner’s experts’ reliance on mice studies
“flawed for several reasons. First, there are only two studies. Second, the studies
56

Joiner, 522 U.S. at 139.

57
Id. In testing its electrical transformers in 1983, the city found that 19.2% of its
transformers contained hazardous levels of PCBs. See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 864 F. Supp.
1310, 1312-13 (N.D. Ga. 1994).
58
Id. (“Congress, with limited exceptions, banned the production and sale of PCBs in
1978.”).
59

Id. at 139.

60

Id. at 139-140.

61

Joiner, 864 F. Supp. at 1314.

62

Id. at 1320-21.

63

Id. at 1321.

64

Id. at 1322-23.
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obviously used massive doses of PCBs.”65 The court determined that Joiner’s
“experts erred in relying on the mice studies to opine that PCBs caused Joiner’s lung
cancer ‘to a reasonable degree of medical certainty.’”66 The court held that it “need
not address whether the studies that Plaintiffs’ experts rely upon were conducted in a
scientific manner, for the studies simply do not support the experts’ position that
PCBs more probably than not promoted Joiner’s lung cancer . . . . [T]he opinions of
Plaintiffs’ experts do not rise above ‘subjective belief or unsupported speculation.’”67
Because the exclusion of his experts left Joiner without any evidence of causation,
the district court granted summary judgment in favor of General Electric.68
The Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the decision below.69 The court
described Daubert as having “loosen[ed] the strictures of Frye” in order to “make it
easier to present legitimate conflicting views of experts for the jury’s
consideration.”70 Daubert set forth a two-prong test. “Under the first prong,
evidentiary reliability, the district court must examine the reasoning or methodology
underlying the expert opinion,” but the court must “be careful not to cross the line
between deciding whether the expert’s testimony is based on ‘scientifically valid
principles’ and deciding upon the correctness of the expert’s conclusions.”71 “Under
the second prong, relevance, the district court must determine whether the
methodology or reasoning underlying the expert opinion relates to the issue at hand,
i.e., whether it assists the trier of fact in understanding the evidence or a fact at
issue.”72
Ostensibly applying plenary review, the court of appeals found that Joiner’s
experts had applied a sufficiently reliable methodology to withstand a Rule 702
attack:
In this case, [Joiner’s] experts discussed the studies of at least thirteen
different researchers, and referred to several reports of the World Health
Organization that address the question of whether PCBs cause cancer.
[Joiner’s] experts testified that many of these studies were conducted and
analyzed to test specific hypotheses about the relationship between PCBs
and cancer, that many have been published in reputable scientific journals,
and that they were generated and tested using the scientific method. In
ruling [Joiner’s] expert[’s] testimony inadmissible, however, it appears
that the district court . . . accepted defendants’ criticisms of the
conclusions reached in those studies, stating that “the studies simply do
not support the experts’ position that PCBs more probably than not
65

Id. at 1323.

66

Id. at 1324 (quoting Wells v. Ortho Pharm. Corp., 615 F. Supp 262, 295 (N.D. Ga.

1985).
67

Id. at 1326.

68

See id. at 1327.

69

See Joiner v. Gen. Elec. Co., 78 F.3d 524, 534 (11th Cir. 1996).

70

Id. at 530.

71

Id.

72

Id.
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promoted Joiner’s lung cancer.” As Daubert makes clear, the district
court may not decide whether an expert’s opinions are correct, but merely
whether the bases supporting the conclusions are reliable.73
The Supreme Court reversed and remanded. The Court first held that
admissibility decisions under Rule 702 are to be reviewed under an abuse of
discretion standard.74 The Court next held that “a proper application of the correct
standard of review here indicates that the District Court did not abuse its discretion”
in excluding Joiner’s experts.75 The Court rejected Joiner’s argument that the district
court “committed legal error” in passing upon the reliability of his experts’
conclusions rather than merely their methodologies:
[C]onclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct from one another.
. . . [N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires
a district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data
only by the ipse dixit of the expert. A court may conclude that there is
simply too great an analytical gap between the data and the opinion
proffered.76
As to whether the district court had abused its discretion in concluding that “the
studies upon which [Joiner’s] experts relied were not sufficient, whether individually
or in combination, to support their conclusions that Joiner’s exposure to PCB’s
contributed to his cancer,” the Supreme Court held that it had not.77 The Court
described the mice studies as “seemingly far-removed” from the question of whether
Joiner’s PCB exposure could have caused his specific cancer.78 The Court also
agreed that the “four epidemiological studies” on which Joiner’s experts relied did
not purport to establish a causal connection between lung cancer and PCBs and “did
not support the experts’ conclusion that Joiner’s exposure to PCBs caused his
cancer.”79
Justice Breyer concurred in the majority opinion, and Justice Stevens sharply
dissented. Justice Breyer’s concurrence emphasized that a trial court’s gatekeeping
duties “must be exercised with special care” in cases “when law and science
intersect,” such as in toxic torts cases.80 Because “modern life,” Justice Breyer
stated, “depends upon the use of artificial or manufactured substances,” trial courts’
“Daubert gatekeeping function” helped to “assure that the powerful engine of tort
liability . . . points toward the right substances and does not destroy the wrong
Moreover, Justice Breyer concluded that “Daubert’s gatekeeping
ones.”81
73

Id. at 533 (citation omitted).

74

See Gen. Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1997).

75

Id. at 143.

76

Id. at 146.

77

Id. at 146-47.

78

Id. at 144.

79

Id. at 144, 145.

80

Id. at 148 (Breyer, J., concurring).

81

Id. at 148-49.
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requirement . . . will help secure the basic objectives of the Federal Rules of
Evidence; which are . . . the ascertainment of truth and the just determination of the
proceedings.”82
Justice Stevens’ dissent agreed with the majority that the district court’s decision
should have been reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard83 but took the view
that the district court’s “reliability ruling . . . arguably [was] not faithful to the
statement in Daubert that ‘the focus, of course, must be solely on the principles and
methodology, not the conclusions that they generate.’”84 Justice Stevens thought that
Joiner’s experts had employed “a ‘weight of the evidence’ methodology,” which was
not “intrinsically ‘unscientific’” or “the sort of ‘junk science’ with which Daubert
was concerned.”85 In fact, Justice Stevens pointed out, the Environmental Protection
Agency “uses the same methodology to assess risks, albeit using a somewhat
different threshold than that required in a trial.”86 All in all, “it would seem that an
expert could reasonably have concluded that [the various human and animal studies
in combination] raises an inference that PCBs promote lung cancer.”87
Joiner “represent[ed] a marked amendment to the content of the reliability
standard announced in Daubert.”88 As an initial matter, the Court rejected the
dichotomy between methodology and conclusions, which supplemented Daubert’s
teeth significantly. More fundamentally, the case involved a choice between two
“quite different methodologies in determining issues of causation.”89 On the one
hand, there is the methodology of “the theoretical scientist, whose mission is to
search for enduring truths about the state of nature.”90 That is, the question for the
theoretical scientist is “‘does substance A cause disease B?’”91 On the other hand is
the methodology of what might be termed “practical scientists,” such as those “who
advise environmental and public health regulat[ions],” and whose “mission is to
make predictions about how likely it is that substance A is causing disease B.”92
Such scientists are in the business of determining whether a causal connection is
82

Id. at 150.

83

Id. at 150 (Stevens, J., dissenting in part).

84

Id. at 152.

85

Id. at 153.

86

Id. at 153-54. Indeed, the Court explicitly approved of this method of analysis in the
context of administrative rulemaking in The Benzene Case over a decade earlier. See Indus.
Union Dep’t v. API, 448 U.S. 607, 656 (1980) (plurality opinion) (“[S]o long as they are
supported by a body of reputable scientific thought, [OSHA] is free to use conservative
assumptions in interpreting the data with respect to carcinogens, risking error on the side of
overprotection rather than underprotection.”).
87

Id. at 154.

88

Michael H. Gottesman, From Barefoot to Daubert to Joiner: Triple Play or Double
Error?, 40 ARIZ. L. REV. 753, 766 (1998) [hereinafter Gottesman, Triple Play].
89

Id.

90

Id.

91

Id. at 769.

92

Id.
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“likelier than not,” and they utilize the “weight of the evidence” methodology to
reach their conclusions.93 Rather than searching for some inherent truth, these
scientists engage in traditional cost-benefit calculus.94
As a matter of precedent, the Court’s opinion in Joiner left open the possibility
that it is not an abuse of discretion to admit the practical scientist’s “weight of the
evidence” methodology—and, indeed, might not have been an abuse of discretion to
admit Joiner’s expert evidence. However, the tone of the Court’s opinion at least
carried with it an implication that the weight of the evidence methodology is, as a
matter of law, insufficiently reliable under Rule 702.95 After all, it characterized the
opinions of Joiner’s experts as “connected to existing data only by [their] ipse
dixit.”96 Moreover, the weight of the evidence approach is designed to allow a risk
assessor to reach cost-benefit conclusions, rather than to “ascertain the truth” of
whether the defendant’s actions were causally connected to the plaintiff’s injuries.
The approach therefore does not fit comfortably with Justice Breyer’s concurrence,
which emphasized the “ascertainment of truth” as one of the two primary objectives
of the Rules of Evidence.97 This might be why lower courts post-Joiner have
explicitly adopted the view that Rule 702 requires a much higher degree of scientific
certainty than that required for ex ante regulatory action.98
93

Id.

94

Id.

95

See Harvey Brown, Eight Gates for Expert Witnesses, 36 HOUS. L. REV. 743, 845
(1999).
96

Gen. Elec. Co., 522 U.S. at 146.

97

Id. at 150. It is interesting to compare Justice Breyer’s concurrence and its emphasis on
“ascertainment of truth” with Ferebee v. Chevron Chem. Co., 736 F.2d 1529 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
In Ferebee, the D.C. Circuit stated that
a cause-effect relationship need not be clearly established by animal or
epidemiological studies before a doctor can testify that, in his opinion, such a
relationship exists. As long as the basic methodology employed to reach such a
conclusion is sound, such as the use of tissue samples, standard tests, and patient
examination, products liability law does not preclude recovery until a “statistically
significant” number of people have been injured or until science has had the time and
resources to complete sophisticated laboratory studies of the chemical. In a
courtroom, the test for allowing a plaintiff to recover in a tort suit of this type is not
scientific certainty but legal sufficiency; if reasonable jurors could conclude from the
expert testimony that paraquat more likely than not caused Ferebee’s injury, the fact
that . . . science would require more evidence before conclusively considering the
causation question resolved is irrelevant.
736 F.2d at 1535-36.
98
See, e.g., Hollander v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 289 F.3d 1193 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming
the district court’s exclusion of the plaintiff’s causation expert, who testified to a causal
connection between plaintiff’s use of the drug Parlodel—prescribed as, among other things, a
lactation suppressant to postpartum women—and her intracerebral hemorrhage less than a
week after she began using the drug). The Tenth Circuit stated that
[the plaintiff’s] evidence provided support for the FDA’s decision to withdraw the
indication for Parlodel as a postpartum lactation suppressant, as well as for the
decisions of experienced clinicians that the apparent risks of Parlodel outweighed the
limited benefits of prescribing the drug as a lactation suppressant. However, the
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To the extent that Joiner ratified the reliability of the theoretical scientist’s
methodology and cast substantial, if not complete, doubt as to the reliability of the
practical scientist’s methodology, Joiner reinforced Daubert’s explicit linkage
between “evidentiary reliability” and “scientific validity.”
C. Linking Evidentiary Reliability to Scientific Validity: A Static Bar Approach to
Admissibility
Professor Berger has argued that the “unstated message” of Daubert and Joiner is
that “evidence that is inconclusive from a scientific perspective automatically fails to
satisfy” Rule 702’s reliability threshold and thus must be excluded. 99 In other
words, the quality of the evidence that is required for a “reliable courtroom
conclusion”—that is, an expert proffer that meets the Rule 702’s “reliability
threshold”—is the same as that which theoretical scientists would require before
reaching a “scientifically valid” conclusion for non-litigation purposes. This
effectively means that, under Daubert and Joiner’s evidentiary philosophy, “science
and the law are answering the same question when asked to determine causation.”100
One consequence of linking evidentiary reliability with scientific validity is that
“a uniform standard of ‘reliability’ . . . will apply equally no matter what the issue
being litigated . . . .”101 Returning to the Vosburg v. Putney example, if a scientist is
asked whether a schoolmate’s kick caused damage to a young man’s shin bone, he or
she does not need to know whether the blow was malicious as opposed to an
unintentional act. Yet, as a matter of substantive tort law, traditionally the causation
requirement has been “loosened” in cases where the defendant’s conduct was
particularly reprehensible.102 To the extent that the “reliability screen . . . presumes
that the [causation] question is one of scientific ‘fact’ rather than a policy choice in
the context of scientific uncertainty” is “insensitive” to policy concerns that
classically underlie substantive tort law.103 This might be called a “static bar
approach” to admissibility.
district court did not abuse its discretion in ruling that the . . . evidence did not satisfy
the Daubert standard of reliability.
Id. at 1217; see also Rider v. Sandoz Pharms. Corp., 295 F.3d 1194, 1201 (11th Cir. 2002)
(“[The] risk-utility analysis involves a much lower standard than that which is demanded by a
court of law. A regulatory agency such as the FDA may choose to err on the side of caution.
Courts, however, are required by the Daubert trilogy to engage in an objective review of
evidence to determine whether it has sufficient . . . basis to be considered reliable.”).
99

Berger, Upsetting the Balance, supra note 10, at 297, 299.

100

Id. at 299.

101

Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 762.

102

See, e.g., Malone, supra note 22, at 72-73.

103

Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 762; see also Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Is
Science a Special Case? The Admissibility of Scientific Evidence After Daubert v. Merrell
Dow, 73 TEX. L. REV. 1779, 1794-95 (1995) (criticizing Daubert’s underlying assumption
“that law and science are aimed at the same thing—finding the truth. This assumption makes
law sound rather lofty, but it oversimplifies the role of courts and distorts the purpose of the
rules they apply. A more accurate view is that adjudication is intended to restore social
harmony among parties in dispute; what adjudication seeks is repose . . . . For some cases that
very well may mean creating a compensatory mechanism even in the absence of clear
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Daubert’s and Joiner’s mode of analysis—linking admissibility to scientific
validity—defaults to the status quo ante. That is, in cases of scientific uncertainty,
the presumption is that law—at least tort law—should not intervene. 104 As Judge
Posner once put it, “law lags science.”105
Scholars have debated whether a “lagging tort system” is preferable to a more
reactive system. Specifically, a court in the latter system will allow the jury to
decide a case despite strong scientific uncertainty as to whether there is a causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury. On the one
hand, a tort system that restrains from imposing liability in the face of scientific
uncertainty tends to reduce the problem of inefficient over-deterrence: There can be
little doubt that the potential for tort liability negatively affects the incentives to
engage in conduct such as the creation and marketing of new drugs, vaccines, or
other products—conduct that is often socially beneficial on net, even when
accompanied by risk of harm.106 To the extent the tort system becomes overzealous
in its regulation, through imposition of liability, of socially beneficial activities that
possibly—but not certainly—create harmful side effects, it begins to exhibit the same
flaws as the so-called Precautionary Principle.107 Professor Sunstein has argued, “[a]
scientific proof of cause and effect.”); Lucinda M. Finley, Guarding the Gate to the
Courthouse: How Trial Judges are Using Their Evidentiary Screening Role to Remake Tort
Causation Rules, 49 DEPAUL L. REV. 335, 365 (1999) (“Epidemiologists do not have to make
decisions about who should financially bear a risk, or about how responsibility for ascertaining
and reducing a risk should be allocated.”).
104
Anthony Z. Roisman, Conflict Resolution in the Courts: The Role of Science, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 1945, 1950-51 (1994) (“[Daubert’s presumption is] that it is better not to
have a legal resolution of a dispute than to have the dispute resolved incorrectly. . . . [and] that
individual members of society are more appropriate to bear the risks of commerce than is
society as a whole or those who profit from the activities that create the risk.”).
105

Rosen v. Ciba-Geigy Corp., 78 F.3d 316, 319 (7th Cir. 1996) (“Law lags science; it
does not lead it.”); see also Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 728 (Tex.
1997) (“[T]he law should not be hasty to impose liability when scientifically reliable evidence
is unavailable.”).
106

See Peter Huber, Safety and the Second Best: The Hazards of Public Risk Management
in the Courts, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 277, 311 (1985) (arguing that tort liability “is most certain to
have regressive risk consequences when it delays the introduction of new technology that has
already received administrative approval.”). Huber’s polemic is the whooping cough vaccine.
The vaccine resulted in a net savings of 413 lives per year. However, approximately 25
children per year suffered an adverse reaction to the vaccine that resulted in serious, long-term
brain damage. The vaccine thus “increases the risk of one particular form of injury a little, but
drastically reduces the risk of another.” Id. at 288. Nevertheless, due to “too much regulation
in the courts,” one of the leading producers of the vaccine bailed out of the market in 1984.
Id.; see also Susan R. Poulter, Science and Toxic Torts: Is There a Rational Solution to the
Problem of Causation?, 7 HIGH TECH. L.J. 189, 192-93 (1992) (“Erroneous plaintiffs’ verdicts
and the corresponding overcompensation and over-deterrence are not just academic concerns.
The prospect of useful products being driven from the market or of economic resources being
diverted from productive uses is real, as the cases of vaccines and Bendectin illustrate.”).
107
“The precautionary principle simply reflects the classic adage: Better safe than sorry.
The principle suggests that government should take precautions to protect public health and
the environment, even in the absence of clear evidence of harm and notwithstanding the costs
of such action.” Frank B. Cross, Paradoxical Perils of the Precautionary Principle, 53 WASH.
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rational system of risk regulation certainly takes precautions. But, it does not adopt
the Precautionary Principle.”108 Thus, there are valid arguments that a tort plaintiff
should be required to come forward with causation evidence that meets the standard
of “scientific validity.” If such evidence does not exist, the defendant should not be
exposed to tort liability. Otherwise, the defendant might be deterred from engaging
in conduct that, on net, is socially beneficial.
Yet, a lagging tort system necessarily risks under-deterrence of “inefficient risktaking.”109 At any given time, entire classes of plaintiffs will be foreclosed from
receiving compensation because the science demonstrating a causal connection
between their injuries and would-be defendants’ actions is in its infancy stage, or
simply not yet well enough developed to cross a reliability threshold that is based on
scientific validity. Because there are legal impediments, such as statutes of
limitations, that preclude would-be plaintiffs from waiting to bring their cases until
the science has become more developed, a lagging tort system will necessarily fail to
ensure that all actors will be forced to internalize the harms that their actions
cause.110 Moreover, in many circumstances the ethical and practical limitations of
scientific testing will make it impossible for plaintiffs ever to come forward with
causation evidence meeting a reliability threshold based on scientific validity.111 In
such cases, a putative defendant will escape any liability exposure even if it is agreed
that there is a non-zero chance that its conduct has caused and continues to cause
harm—the very definition of under-deterrence.
In modern society, scientific evidence often suggests a possible causal connection
between a particular activity (ground water pollution, for example) and a particular
harm (cancer); however, the evidence is not demonstrative of a statistically or
scientifically certain causal connection. Thus, under an admissibility regime that
demands such statistical or scientific certainty, some amount of under-deterrence is
unavoidable. Yet, a return to a “let it all in” regime is both unwise—it might solve
the under-deterrence problem but would create in its place an over-deterrence
problem—and impractical given the burdens already being placed on the judicial
system. Still, solving the under-deterrence problem is critical because, in many
& LEE L. REV. 851, 851 (1996). The logical flaw of the Precautionary Principle is that
“regulation will often cause more . . . harm than good.” Id. at 860.
108

Cass R. Sunstein, The Paralyzing Principle, REGULATION, Winter 2002-2003, at 37.

109

David Rosenberg, The Causal Connection in Mass Exposure Cases: A “Public Law”
Vision of the Tort System, 97 HARV. L. REV. 849, 862 (1984).
110

Although there has been very little, if any, study of Daubert from the perspective of
law and economics, intuitively the Daubert standard must result in a failure to optimally deter
possibly harmful conduct. Cf. Steve Gold, Note, Causation in Toxic Torts: Burdens of Proof,
Standards of Persuasion, and Statistical Evidence, 96 YALE L.J. 376, 397 (1984) (“Any
system of all-or-nothing awards is economically inefficient in toxic torts cases.”). After all,
the Daubert standard is “all-or-nothing”—at least when administered in a tort regime that
utilizes an “all-or-nothing” preponderance of the evidence approach to compensation—in the
sense that a plaintiff’s expert causation evidence will be excluded (effectively sinking the
plaintiff’s case) even where the state of the science gives one reason to at least suspect a
causal connection between A and B.
111

Clifford Fisher, The Role of Causation in Science as Law and Proposed Changes in the
Current Common Law Toxic Tort System, 9 BUFF. ENVTL. L.J. 35, 63 (2001).
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contexts, “false negatives are costlier than false positives.”112 A new, creative
solution might be in order.
One possible solution is to use a method of “‘public law’ adjudication as a
substitute for the system’s traditional individualized process in order to resolve
causal connection questions . . . .”113 “[T]he central component of this . . . approach
is the replacement of the preponderance rule by a standard of proportional liability,”
and “courts would impose liability and distribute compensation in proportion to the
probability of causation assigned to the excess disease risk in the exposed
population, regardless whether that probability fell above or below the fifty-percent
threshold and despite the absence of individualized proof of the causal
connection.”114 Under this system, a plaintiff would not be required to introduce
scientific evidence demonstrating a causal connection between his or her injuries and
the defendant’s conduct. Rather, the plaintiff would only need to introduce evidence
demonstrating that the defendant’s conduct increased the risk of the plaintiff’s
injury.115 The plaintiff’s recovery would be limited to the extent of the increase. For
example, if a plaintiff’s expert could reliably testify to a thirty percent likelihood that
the plaintiff’s injuries were caused by the defendant’s conduct, then the defendant
would be liable for up to thirty percent of the plaintiff’s injuries.116
A second potential solution is even more radical: A defendant’s liability is
determined by a finding of inadequate testing. This solution—which might be called
“inadequate testing liability”—is based not so much on optimal deterrence as on
“tort law’s corrective justice rationale that liability is linked to moral
responsibility.”117 Professor Berger, one of the leading proponents of this solution,
argues “that if a defendant is negligent in discovering and disseminating substantial
adverse information about its product . . . it should be liable for adverse health
effects in those exposed, and plaintiffs should be relieved of proving general
causation.”118 This argument is premised on the view that “[a] corporation should
112

Id. at 47.

113

Rosenberg, supra note 109, at 859.

114

Id.

115
Daniel A. Farber, Toxic Causation, 71 MINN. L. REV. 1219, 1220-21 (1987) (“[I]f there
was a thirty percent likelihood that the defendant caused the plaintiff’s cancer, the plaintiff
would receive thirty percent of his total damages.”).
116
Although the proportional liability proposal was not intended as a solution to the
problem of expert evidence admissibility, some evidence scholars have suggested a version of
proportional liability to deal with the problem of scientific uncertainty. See Feldman, supra
note 48, at 45 (“Another option would be to split damages in half . . . in any case in which the
plaintiff could establish strong uncertainty about causation, and the defendant could not
eliminate it. [Such a change] would increase the incentive for the makers of potentially toxic
substances to investigate the substances’ causal powers more carefully before distributing
them widely.”).
117

Margaret A. Berger, Eliminating General Causation: Notes Towards a New Theory of
Justice and Toxic Torts, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 2117, 2119 (1997) [hereinafter Berger,
Eliminating General Causation].
118

Id. at 2147. There have been a few different iterations of the inadequate testing
proposal. For example, one commentator has argued that, if the plaintiff can show that the
defendant inadequately tested its product, there should be a rebuttable presumption that the

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

19

598

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:579

have no incentive to gamble that its product is probably safe or that proving
causation will likely take twenty years.”119
Both the proportional liability and inadequate testing liability proposals have
serious limitations and provide, at best, an imperfect answer to the under-deterrence
problem inherent in a Rule 702 regime that equates evidentiary admissibility with
scientific validity.
With respect to the proportional liability approach, its
applicability to circumstances outside the mass exposure context is doubtful.120 As
Peter Huber points out, “[o]nly mass-exposure defendants can practicably be called
to account for the risk—as distinguished from the harm—they create, and only in the
mass-exposure context do the proportional liability rules and streamlined ‘public
law’ procedures make any sense.”121 Huber might be overshooting a bit, but his
point that “only mass producers can be required to pay accelerated compensation for
risk created”122 is well taken.
More broadly, the proportional liability rule depends “upon the existence of
reliable, meaningful information” about the probability that there is a causal
connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injury.123 It is
therefore unclear whether the proportional liability rule would provide much
assistance to plaintiffs in circumstances of “[s]trong uncertainty about general
causation.”124 In such circumstances, proportional liability would, at best, result in
compensatory outcomes that approximate best guesses at the likelihood of causal
connections.125 Under a proportional liability regime, therefore, the Daubert inquiry
would simply shift to an examination of whether a plaintiff’s (or a defendant’s)
expert’s opinion regarding the statistical causal connection between A and B clears
the reliability threshold.126 Thus, although proportional liability is an elegant
product caused the plaintiff’s harm. See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the
Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82 CORNELL L. REV. 773, 834 (1997).
119

Berger, Eliminating General Causation, supra note 117, at 2147.

120

Indeed, it is not obvious that Professor Rosenberg would argue for application of
proportional liability outside of the mass exposure context. See Rosenberg, supra note 109, at
858 (“The preponderance rule may be adequate for the set of sporadic accident cases in which
causal indeterminancy arises randomly and always signifies a substantial chance that the
defendant in fact harmed no one.”).
121

Huber, supra note 106, at 315.

122

Id.

123

Feldman, supra note 48, at 39.

124

Id. at 40.

125

See David A. Fischer, Proportional Liability: Statistical Evidence and the Probability
Paradox, 46 VAND. L. REV. 1201, 1221 n.51 (1993).
126

See Gold, supra note 110, at 397-98 (“Rosenberg imagines a mystically precise
probability that would determine the proportional recovery. His proposal would have
plaintiffs pick their preferred probability, plead it, and prove it, while defendants could assert
lower probabilities. The trouble is that it may be impossible rationally to choose any such
value. Even a convincingly proven value would still be only an estimate; hence no scientific
justification exists for setting the proportion equal to the reported value rather than at some
other point in the reasonable range. Yet, under such a system, plaintiffs and defendants would
likely end up bidding for duplicative and wasteful studies, jockeying for possession of the
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solution to the problems caused by the “all-or-nothing, more probable than not”
regime, it does not appear to be an adequate solution to the potential underdeterrence problems inherent in a Rule 702 regime that links reliability to scientific
validity.127
Perhaps the most intractable problem with the proportional liability rule,
however, is a practical one: it is unlikely to be adopted by courts or legislatures.
Even the leading proponents of proportional liability would likely concede that an
abandonment of the all-or-nothing, more probable than not rule is unlikely to derive
from the judiciary, if for no other reason than inertia.128 And legislatures seem
unlikely to abandon the preponderance rule, if only because such a change would be
politically unpopular with a culture that largely disdains the plaintiff’s bar.
The inadequate testing liability proposal is likewise far from an ideal solution
either. As an initial matter, it is even more radical than the proportional liability
proposal because it disregards causation as an element entirely.129 Like proportional
liability, it seems unlikely that either courts or legislatures would enact such a
reform, which quite literally would create a new category of tort: failure to test
adequately.130 Beyond this, however, imposing liability for inadequate testing might
not do much to simplify matters for the jury or the court. There would remain the
problem of determining whether the defendant in fact failed to test its product
adequately. In some cases this determination might be easy—for example, when
there is evidence that the defendant was willfully blind to known risks,131
study with the highest (or lowest) reported probability estimate.”); Farber, supra note 115, at
1227 (“[C]ausation of diseases like cancer is so poorly understood . . . . Many toxic
substances are relatively novel, and, given the long latency periods associated with cancer,
sufficient evidence concerning health effects is not likely to be available for the foreseeable
future . . . . Epidemiological studies are . . . helpful but often inconclusive regarding the level
of risk created by a toxic substance.”); Charles Nesson, Agent Orange Meets the Blue Bus:
Factfinding at the Frontier of Knowledge, 66 B.U. L. Rev. 521, 534 (1986) (noting that there
is “little likelihood of firm conclusions” on scientific causation questions).
127
Professor Feldman has referred to this as a “timing problem”: “[M]ass exposure . . .
suits . . . are put in motion and require resolution before there is sufficient scientific data to
determine reliably the causal powers of the substances in question.” Feldman, supra note 48,
at 45-46.
128
See Fischer, supra note 125, at 1226. As Professor Fischer notes, “The type of
proportional liability that does the best overall job of providing compensation and achieving
corrective justice is proportional risk recovery.” Id. Yet, “this version of proportional liability
represents the most significant departure from traditional tort principles,” and “[t]herefore,
courts and legislatures are least likely to adopt it.” Id.
129

Richard L. Cupp, Jr., Believing in Products Liability: Reflections on Daubert, Doctrinal
Evolution, and David Owen’s Products Liability Law, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 511, 524 (2006)
(“[Inadequate testing liability] is a bold proposal, not an evolutionary baby step.”).
130

See Margaret Berger & Aaron D. Twerski, Uncertainty and Informed Choice:
Unmasking Daubert, 104 MICH. L. REV. 257, 259 (2005) (arguing that courts should
“recognize the right of [consumers] to informed choice about risks associated with the use of a
[product], a right that does not require plaintiffs to prove that the toxic agent was the cause of
the plaintiff’s harm.”).
131
See, e.g., Barrow v. Bristol-Myers Squibb Co., No. 96-689-CIV-ORL-19B, 1998 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 23187, at *204 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 1998) (“MEC, the party in the superior

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

21

600

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:579

particularly risks that could have easily been discovered with modest further testing.
But in other cases, it would be a complex question and there is little reason to believe
that a jury will be able to assess accurately whether the defendant tested sufficiently,
an inquiry that would require a complex analysis of the costs and benefits of more
testing and increased deliberation on the part of the defendant.
In addition, creating liability for inadequate testing would likely “delay the
availability of innovative, potentially beneficial products.” 132 Thus, the inadequate
testing proposal would solve one problem—under-deterrence—but potentially result
in an equally (or even more) serious problem—over-deterrence.
Finally, the inadequate testing proposal would seemingly operate as a sui generis
rule applicable only in products liability torts. It would have no application in other
contexts in which causation experts make up the heart of a plaintiff’s case.
However, the proportional liability approach, and perhaps even the inadequate
testing approach, should not be disregarded as potentially valuable changes to
American tort law.133 In the next section, the author offers a more modest, yet
potentially effective, solution to the under-deterrence problem that Daubert might
cause: Rather than a static bar approach to admissibility, risk assessment principles
should be integrated into the expert evidence inquiry. Under this type of approach to
admissibility questions, the degree of reliability that a court would require of expert
causation testimony in any given case would be adjusted according to whether
principles of economic efficiency and social utility pushed in favor of placing either
more or less of the burden of uncertainty on the plaintiff.134
The author’s proposal is based on the assumptions that (1) courts are required to
assess the reliability of proffered expert testimony before allowing its admission;135
position to know of the defects in [its silicone breast implants] and the party with the superior
economic capability to design and conduct tests to determine the safety of its product before
offering it for sale, essentially turned a blind eye to the harms that could befall a person
implanted with its [product]. MEC took an ‘ostrich approach’ to potential harms from its
product so that it could contend, as it has done in this case, that it ‘did not know’ of such
harms when complaints were made.”).
132

See Feldman, supra note 48, at 46. Perhaps in an attempt to temper this concern,
Professors Berger and Twerski have seemed to suggest that dispensing with the traditional
causation requirement might be restricted to what they call “lifestyle” products. See Berger &
Twerski, supra note 130, at 289. But see id. at 287 n.148 (conceding that there is no clear line
between “therapeutic” and “lifestyle” drugs).
133
The proportional liability is particularly attractive as a matter of theory. See Farber,
supra note 115, at 1240 (“[T]he general policies of tort law are advanced by allowing
proportional recovery.”); Steven Shavell, Uncertainty Over Causation and the Determination
of Civil Liability, 28 J.L. & ECON. 587, 587 (1985) (“[L]iability in proportion to the probability
of causation is superior to all other criteria and results in socially ideal behavior.”). However,
the chance that courts or legislatures will widely adopt a proportional liability rule seems
sufficiently remote. More modest alternatives that attempt to serve similar ends must be
explored.
134

To the extent that the plaintiff has the burden of demonstrating the reliability of its
expert, the burden of uncertainty is necessarily placed on the plaintiff. Adjusting the
reliability bar up or down, however, will determine just how much uncertainty the plaintiff
will be forced to bear.
135

In other words, my proposal assumes the continued existence of a gate-keeping duty.
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and (2) that tort claims will continue to be governed under the traditional “all-ornothing, more probable than not” rule with the plaintiff bearing the burden of
proving causation. The proposal is based on the idea that the most problematic
aspect of Daubert’s mode of analysis is not that it sets the reliability bar too high or
too low, but that it suggests that the bar should be set in the same place in every case.
III. A MOVING BAR APPROACH TO ASSESSING THE RELIABILITY OF EXPERT
CAUSATION TESTIMONY
The previous section demonstrated that Daubert and Joiner collectively imply
that a court’s assessment of whether expert causation evidence is sufficiently reliable
to be admitted ought not be influenced by case-specific tort policy considerations,
such as deterrence. This Article refers to this as the “static bar” approach to
admissibility. Under such an approach, a court is not permitted to adjust the height
of the reliability bar—that is, accept a lesser (or demand a greater) degree of
reliability of a causation expert’s proffer—based upon case-specific policy
considerations.
In this section, the author proposes an alternative approach to questions of
admissibility that would affirmatively incorporate case-specific policy considerations
into the court’s analysis of whether a causation expert’s proffer is sufficiently
reliable to warrant admission. This approach is called a “moving bar” approach to
admissibility. The author first argues that policy considerations historically
influenced courts in deciding whether to allow juries to speculate on uncertain
causation-in-fact questions and that this was justified on economic grounds. The
author then argues that because of the outcome determinative role of admissibility
decisions in modern litigation, policy considerations should similarly influence
courts in their analysis of whether a causation expert is sufficiently reliable to
warrant admission.
A. The Traditional Role of Policy in Helping to Resolve Uncertain Questions of
Causation
There can be no doubt that tort law and the modern regulatory system have been
treated as distinct legal vehicles serving distinct ends. One of the most pellucid
examples of this is Judge Weinstein’s opinion in the Agent Orange136 case. Although
Judge Weinstein recognized that there was sufficient evidence of Agent Orange’s
toxicity to justify ex ante regulation of the product, there was insufficient evidence to
warrant ex post compensation via tort law:
The distinction between avoidance of risk through regulation and
compensation for injuries after the fact is a fundamental one. In the
former, risk assessments may lead to control of a toxic substance even
though the probability of harm to any individual is small and the studies
necessary to assess the risk are incomplete; society as a whole is willing to
pay the price as a matter of policy. In the latter, a far higher probability
(greater than 50%) is required since the law believes it unfair to require an

136

In re “Agent Orange” Prod. Liab. Litig., 597 F. Supp. 740 (E.D.N.Y. 1984).
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individual to pay for another’s tragedy unless it is shown that it is more
likely than not that he caused it.137
Nevertheless, there is substantial literature documenting the tort system’s goal of,
and role in, deterring harmful conduct ex ante.138 To the extent that “tort law
generates penalties . . . that give future actors a material incentive either to take
precautions while acting or to avoid the activity altogether,”139 the tort system’s goals
and effects largely overlap those of the regulatory system.140
Consistent with its regulatory-type role in influencing the economic incentives of
private actors, tort law has been shaped in significant ways by policy
considerations,141 and courts’ decisions traditionally have been imbued with, and
animated by, broader policy concerns. As Professor Malone wrote more than fifty
years ago, courts’ decisions regarding causation-in-fact could largely be explained by
“the mysterious relationship between policy and fact.”142 Professor Prosser similarly
treated causation as a “thin shell[] into which a variety of policy judgments could be
poured.”143 Contemporary law and economics scholars take the normative view that
the function of all tort rules is to “bring about . . . the efficient . . . level of accidents
and safety,”144 which undoubtedly rings of policy.
137

Id. at 781.

138

See, e.g., John C. P. Goldberg, Twentieth-Century Tort Theory, 91 GEO. L.J. 513, 54445 (2003) (describing views of “compensation-deterrence theorists”).
139

Id. at 544.

140

See Peter L. Kahn, Regulation and Simple Arithmetic: Shifting the Perspective on Tort
Reform, 72 N.C. L. REV. 1129, 1135 (1994) (“If there were no formal administrative
regulation of health and safety, the tort system would nevertheless provide some control over
health and safety decisions by private parties such as product manufacturers or service
providers.”); Rosenberg, supra note 109, at 926 (arguing that class actions in particular
provide a “comprehensive, regulatory perspective”); Richard A. Posner, A Theory of
Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29, 31 (1972) (“[T]he creation of private rights of action can
also be a means of regulation.”).
141
See, e.g., Welco Indus., Inc. v. Applied Cos., 617 N.E.2d 1129, 1133 (Ohio 1993)
(stating that tort law “is guided largely by public policy considerations”); MORTON J.
HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1780-1860, at 99 (1977). For example,
according to Professor Horwitz’s “subsidy thesis,” the shift from strict liability to negligence
in American law in the nineteenth century was driven by the desire to promote economic
growth. Professor Horwitz’s subsidy thesis has been attacked on empirical grounds. See, e.g.,
Gary T. Schwartz, The Character of Early American Tort Law, 36 UCLA L. REV. 641 (1989).
142

Malone, supra note 22, at 60-61 (“At the close of the [nineteenth century,] courts used
the term ‘cause’ indiscriminately to express either their conclusion as to ‘what happened’ or as
a means of explaining what law ‘ought to do about it.’”). Professor Malone phrased the
problem in terms of a range of possibilities that the defendant’s conduct was a cause-in-fact of
the injury that might satisfy a court enough to send a case to the jury. “The point at which [a
court] might be satisfied can be expressed in many ways, such as ‘barely possible,’ ‘possible,’
‘not unlikely,’ ‘as possible as not,’ ‘probable,’ ‘highly probable,’ or ‘virtually certain.’” Id. at
67.
143
Benjamin C. Zipursky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 649, 689 (1998).
144

Posner, supra note 140, at 33.
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That policy considerations drive “substantive tort law”—that is, liability rules—
does not rest easily with the fact that, as has been argued above, the Daubert/Joiner
mode of analysis of assessing the “reliability” of an expert proffer is bereft of policy
considerations. To be sure, Daubert’s recognition of a trial judge’s gatekeeping role
was driven by various policy concerns.145 But, to the extent that “reliability” is to be
determined according to “scientific validity,” a court’s reliability assessment should
not be affected by policy considerations unique to the case at hand. As Professor
Gottesman puts it, Daubert treats reliability as a “question . . . of scientific ‘fact’
rather than a policy choice in the context of scientific uncertainty” resulting in
“policy choices [being] ignored under the guise of administering a rule of
evidence.”146
Because admissibility decisions essentially operate as “summary judgment
substitutes,”147 it should be cause for concern that the Daubert/Joiner mode of
analysis results in trial outcomes that might impede the achievement of substantive
tort policies—namely the goal of optimal deterrence. Setting aside whether this
raises concerns under the Rules Enabling Act148—a topic that is far beyond the scope
of this Article—it arguably demonstrates that Daubert took a wrong turn somewhere
along the line.
The mistake lies in the premise that the tort system is foremost concerned with
pure “truth-seeking.”149 Although it might sound absurd to criticize such a
premise—if for no other reason than Federal Rule of Evidence 102 provides that
“[t]hese rules shall be construed to secure . . . promotion of growth and development
145

See, e.g., Bobby Marzine Harges, An Analysis of Expert Testimony in Louisiana State
Courts After State v. Foret and Independent Fire Insurance Company v. Sunbeam Corporation,
49 LOY. L. REV. 79, 79 (2003) (“The policy reason behind the Daubert decision was to
exclude ‘junk’ science and experts who would testify to anything without any scientific
basis.”); see also, Joiner, 522 U.S. at 148-49 (Breyer, J., concurring) (asserting that the
“Daubert gatekeeping function . . . help[s] assure that the powerful engine of tort liability . . .
points toward the right substances and does not destroy the wrong ones.”).
146

Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 762.

147

Lind, supra note 19, at 772-74 (“Where liability . . . turns on the opinions of conflicting
experts, summary judgment would normally be precluded as a defense option . . . . However,
if the plaintiff’s experts’ opinions can be excluded, this removes a linchpin source the plaintiff
can use to oppose summary judgment. . . . [M]any commentators conclude the outcome of a
Daubert hearing determines the outcome of a case.”). Professor Ronald Allen has called it
“inevitable” that, under Daubert, courts will “largely make[] sufficiency holdings in the guise
of admissibility holdings.” Ronald J. Allen, Expertise and the Supreme Court: What is the
Problem?, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 1, 12 (2003); see also Dale A. Nance, Reliability and the
Admissibility of Experts, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 191, 216 (2003) (suggesting the same but
pointing out that admissibility rulings are reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard,
while pure sufficiency rulings are reviewed de novo).
148

See generally Michael H. Gottesman, Should Federal Evidence Rules Trump State Tort
Policy? The Federalism Values Daubert Ignored, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 1837 (1994)
[hereinafter Gottesman, Federalism Values].
149

Michael J. Saks, Merlin and Solomon: Lessons from the Law’s Formative Encounters
with Forensic Identification Science, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1131 (1998) (“Daubert’s
approach places so high a value on truth-seeking that it is willing to risk the episodic (and
perhaps cumulative) loss of public confidence.”).
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of the law of evidence to the end that the truth may be ascertained”150—there are
myriad examples of “procedural” rules (including the Rules of Evidence) that cannot
be justified by such an “ascertainment of truth” principle,151 and still other times
evidence is excluded even though it advances the quest for “truth.”152 The most that
can be said is that “discovery of truth is only one of the aims of adjudication under
the Federal Rules [of Evidence].”153
Professor Nesson argues that “[t]he aim of the factfinding process is not to
generate mathematically ‘probable’ verdicts, but rather to generate acceptable
ones.”154 Further, he argues that “[a]cceptable verdicts and probable verdicts might
appear to coincide, given that one obvious way to gain public acceptance is to search
for truth. But the correlation between probability and acceptability is not exact: a
probable verdict may not be acceptable, and an acceptable verdict may not be
probable.”155 Professor Nesson’s insights coincide with scholars’ descriptive and
normative arguments regarding the critical role that policy considerations play in
how courts deal with questions of causation-in-fact.156 Law and economics scholars
150

FED. R. EVID. 102.

151

See Charles Nesson, The Evidence or the Event? On Judicial Proof and the
Acceptability of Verdicts, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1357, 1369 (1985) (“Many rules are indeed
explicable in terms of a truth-seeking rationale. But, on close inspection, some procedures
that are rationalized as truth-seeking devices are better understood as means to promote public
acceptance of verdicts.”). One example that Professor Nesson gives is the hearsay exception
for dying declarations. According to Nesson, “The traditional explanations for admitting these
declarations focus on the necessity and reliability of the evidence. . . . Reliability is predicated
on the idea that a person ‘would be unwilling to go to his maker with a lie on his lips.’” Id. at
1374. But, argues Nesson, “the reliability of such evidence is obviously overstated. . . . The
trial process thus embraces, rather than excludes, the possibly unreliable evidence.” Id.
152

See id. at 1376 (arguing that “the attorney-client privilege more often impedes than
advances the search for truth . . . .”).
153
Brian Leiter, The Epistemology of Admissibility: Why Even Good Philosophy of
Science Would Not Make for Good Philosophy of Evidence, 1997 BYU L. REV. 803, 816
(1997).
154

Nesson, supra note 151, at 1359. Professor Allen has described the view that “the
litigation process is largely designed to yield accurate results” as “naive realism to the max.”
Allen, supra note 147, at 4.
155

Nesson, supra note 151, at 1378.

156

See Richard Delgado, Beyond Sindell: Relaxation of Cause-in-Fact Rules for
Indeterminate Plaintiffs, 70 CAL. L. REV. 881, 891 (1982) (“Malone, Green, Keeton, and
Prosser purport to find a sliding-scale approach, in which courts apply the causation-in-fact
requirement with decreasing stringency as the equities or public policies increasingly favor
recovery.”); id. (“On its face a simple, mechanical formula requiring only a finding of physical
fact, the requirement of but-for causation is in reality a contextual, policy-sensitive
instrument.”); Malone, supra note 22, at 61, 72 (“[P]olicy may often be a factor when the issue
of cause-in-fact is presented sharply for decision . . . . We can now ask: How great must be the
affinity of causal likelihood between the defendant’s wrong and the plaintiff’s injury in order
to justify the judge in submitting the cause issue to the jury? The answer is that the affinity
must be sufficiently close in the opinion of the judge to bring into effective play the rule of
law that would make the defendant’s conduct wrongful.”); Michael S. Moore, Thomson’s
Preliminaries About Causation and Rights, 63 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 497, 501 n.25 (1987) (“The
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in particular have treated the question of causation-in-fact as presenting not a
question of factual probability but instead a question of acceptability, with economic
efficiency being the measure of acceptability: “In [the law and economics] tradition,
if efficiency requires holding the defendant liable, he is said to have caused the
accident, but not otherwise . . . . Landes and Posner are more explicit than others
about this policy judgment . . . . Saying the defendant caused the accident means, in
their view, that efficiency requires holding him liable.”157
To the extent that the decision whether to admit a plaintiff’s causation expert
merges with the decision whether to allow the plaintiff to withstand summary
judgment, it is easy to see how the admissibility inquiry carries with it enormous
policy implications. In cases illustrating that where the plaintiff’s ability to
withstand summary judgment depends upon the admissibility of her causation expert,
the “degree of ‘reliability’ that is imposed as a precondition to allowing the . . .
experts to testify . . . is going to influence where, along the spectrum, the competing
societal interests will be balanced.”158 As Professor Gottesman points out,
[a] government that deems the encouragement of new products more
important than the risk of leaving victims uncompensated might insist
upon a high degree of scientific certainty (or at least probability) before
allowing a case to proceed. On the other hand, a government that
balances the policies differently and values compensation and deterrence
over the societal benefits of risky substances might allow plaintiffs to
recover on a showing that is less conclusive.159
Although Professor Gottesman is correct in finding that Daubert’s mode of
analysis is flawed because it “presumes that the [causation] question is one of
scientific ‘fact’ rather than a policy choice in the context of scientific uncertainty,”160
Professor Gottesman fails to develop adequately how the expert admissibility
analysis ought to be amended in order to deal with this.
influence of Malone, Edgerton, and Green is quite evident in the law and economics literature
on causation. Thus, Guido Calabresi concludes to his satisfaction that ‘in the law cause in
fact’ . . . is in the end a functional concept designed to achieve human goals.” (quoting Guido
Calabresi, Concerning Cause and the Law of Torts: An Essay for Harry Kalven, Jr., 43 U.
CHI. L. REV. 69, 107 (1975))); Steven Shavell, An Analysis of Causation and the Scope of
Liability in the Law of Torts, 9 J. LEGAL STUD. 463, 502 (1980) (arguing that causation should
be defined in order to serve “well-specified social goals” and that “[q]uestions about causation
are to an important extent resolved by resort to intuitions about the justness of applying a rule
of liability.”).
157

Cooter, supra note 20, at 540.

158

Gottesman, Triple Play, supra note 88, at 761. Theoretically there might be cases in
which the admissibility of a defendant’s causation expert might determine whether the
defendant can withstand summary judgment. But these circumstances are likely exceedingly
rare, and possibly non-existent.
159
Id. at 761-62. It is important to emphasize the distinction between “allowing” a
plaintiff to recover and “mandating” that a plaintiff recover. To say that a rule “allows” a
plaintiff to recover is only to say that the rule allows the plaintiff to withstand summary
judgment.
160

Id. Professor Gottesman points out that “in both Daubert and Joiner, the available data
. . . [were] suggestive of causation.” Id. at 769.
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B. Beyond a Static Bar Approach to Assessing Reliability
A modest—yet potentially important—change to the admissibility mode of
analysis would be to move away from what the author earlier called a “static bar
approach” and toward an approach that varies the height of the “reliability bar” on a
case-by-case basis in response to substantive tort policy considerations.161 This
might be called a “moving bar approach.” Unlike a static bar approach—which can
impede the attainment of substantive tort goals, and in particular optimal
deterrence—a moving bar approach would better enable Rule 702 to be instrumental
to the attainment of those goals.
The premise of the moving bar approach is that, in cases involving causal
uncertainty, decisions regarding the admissibility of expert causation testimony are
functionally equivalent to determining whether to send a so-called “loss of chance”
case to the jury.162 Accordingly, the mode of analysis for an admissibility decision
should roughly mirror the mode of analysis courts traditionally have employed in
deciding whether a plaintiff can withstand summary judgment in a loss of chance
case. “[I]n the general run of things tort law has quietly dealt with under
determination and loss of a chance through the rough and ready application of
policy-driven distinctions.”163 Under a moving bar approach to admissibility, the
mode of analysis for admissibility decisions (at least when such decisions involve
causation experts) would likewise deal with uncertainty through a “rough and ready”
application of policy considerations. The proposal for a moving bar approach largely
sidesteps the question whether—as one symposium has put it—the reliability bar is

161
Professor Paul Milich has previously argued for a moving bar approach, but he would
move the bar on entirely different grounds. In Milich’s view:
[I]n deciding how much evidence of reliability a trial judge should require before
admitting novel or controversial scientific evidence, the standard . . . should adjust to
the nature and complexity of the scientific dispute in question . . . . [I]f the scientific
disputes in a particular case are not too technical . . . the trial judge can be comfortable
admitting such evidence upon a modest showing of scientific support and letting the
jury hear and resolve the disputes. But if the scientific disputes concern highly
technical or complicated issues that a jury will not comprehend, let alone master, the
trial judge should require a strong showing of established scientific support before
admitting the evidence.
Paul S. Milich, Controversial Science in the Courtroom: Daubert and the Law’s Hubris, 43
EMORY L.J. 913, 925-26 (1994).
162

See Lind, supra note 19, at 772. “Loss of chance” is sometimes referred to as an
“indeterminate plaintiff problem.” See, e.g., In re “Agent Orange” Prods. Liab. Litig., 611 F.
Supp. at 1408 (“Given the lack of scientific basis for general causation and the significant
uncertainties involved in proof of individual causation—that is, the indeterminate plaintiff
problem—it cannot now be established with any appropriate degree of probability that any
individuals who suffer from the diseases listed in the PMC’s plan incurred them as a result of
Agent Orange exposure, or that these diseases are more likely than others to be causally
related.”). Loss of chance cases often occur in the context of toxic torts, but this is not always
the case. See generally, e.g., Malone, supra note 22 (discussing various paradigmatic loss of
chance cases).
163

Aaron Twerski & Anthony J. Sebok, Liability Without Cause? Further Ruminations on
Cause-in-Fact as Applied to Handgun Liability, 32 CONN. L. REV. 1379, 1383 (2000).
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“too high, too low, or just right.”164 The moving bar approach suggests that the
answers are “it depends” and “maybe all of the above.”
Under a moving bar approach, a trial court could use policy considerations as a
“thumb on the scale” approach with the reliability bar being either lowered or raised
only very slightly in response to the particular facts of the case. Or the moving bar
approach could operate more like a full-on sliding scale, similar to how criminal
courts’ treat the Fourth Amendment’s “reasonableness” standard.165 Finally, the
nature of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct might simply be treated as an
additional factor of indeterminate weight in the Daubert analysis.166
Under either version of the moving bar approach, the trial judge would adjust the
height of the reliability bar up or down depending on the circumstances of the
defendant’s possibly injurious conduct. On the one hand, if the defendant’s conduct
were particularly reprehensible, or possibly injurious conduct such that potential
over-deterrence did not present a concern from the perspective of economic
efficiency,167 then the trial judge would lower the height of the reliability bar. On the
other hand, if the defendant’s conduct was not particularly reprehensible, or if
economic efficiency counseled a greater concern with over-deterrence, the converse
would be true. The important point is this: It would be permissible for a court to take
into consideration the specific nature of the defendant’s allegedly tortious conduct
when deciding whether the testimony of the plaintiff’s causation expert is
sufficiently reliable to qualify for admission into evidence. This would harmonize
the admissibility inquiry with what Professor Malone described as the way in which

164

This was the question posed by the 2003 Seton Hall Law Review Symposium.

165

See Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 232 (1983) (“[P]robable cause is a fluid concept—
turning on the assessment of probabilities in particular factual contexts—not readily, or even
usefully, reduced to a neat set of legal rules.”); see also Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People
Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 359, 395 (1994) (describing the
“reasonableness” test under the Fourth Amendment as a “sliding scale” under which
“reasonableness varie[s] according to the ‘facts and circumstances of each case.’”); Ronald J.
Bacigal, The Fourth Amendment in Flux: The Rise and Fall of Probable Cause, 1979 U. ILL.
L.F. 763, 765 (1979) (“[T]he required degree of probable cause [is] a ‘sliding scale’ that
fluctuates with the peculiar facts of each case.”).
166

The difficulty of integrating a subjective concept into an already amorphous test has
been recognized in other contexts. For example, one commentator has argued that systematic
investment asymmetries and their potential effect on optimal deterrence should be a factor in
the class-certification calculus under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3)’s superiority
requirement, but concedes that the “approach is somewhat inexact.” Randy J. Kozel, Locating
Investment Asymmetries and Optimal Deterrence in the Mass Tort Class Action, 117 HARV. L.
REV. 2665, 2681 (2004) (“Criticizing judicial consideration of litigation investment
asymmetries simply for being inexact . . . is inconsistent with the oftentimes imprecise nature
of modern class action practice.”).
167

Scholars have recognized that, if administrative costs are held constant, over-deterrence
does not present a concern from an economic efficiency standpoint if the conduct at issue
creates no efficiencies in the first place. See, e.g., Thomas A. Lambert, Tweaking Antitrust’s
Business Model, 85 TEX. L. REV. 153, 191 (2006) (noting that “over-deterrence is not a
concern in . . . cases” involving “practices that create no efficiencies, such as naked pricefixing”).
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courts traditionally had decided whether to allow the jury to speculate regarding
causation-in-fact.168
IV. THE MOVING BAR APPROACH IN ACTION
In this part, the author offers a few paradigmatic cases in which a moving bar
approach would mark a significant departure from a static bar approach: (1) cases
involving intentional torts; (2) cases involving the violation of a criminal or
regulatory statute that results in unintended injury to an unintended victim; and (3)
cases involving possibly harmful products that provide objectively minimal benefits.
A. Intentional Torts
Under the Second Restatement of Torts, a tort is “intentional” when the actor
“desires to cause consequences of his act, or . . . believes that the consequences are
substantially certain to result from it.”169 This definition has been criticized as
somewhat misleading,170 and Professor Prosser has stated that intention under tort
law “is not necessarily a hostile intent, or a desire to do any harm. Rather it is an
intent to bring about a result that will invade the interests of another in a way that the
law forbids.”171 Regardless, it is generally agreed that intentional torts are
particularly reprehensible in that they violate rights that society has deemed
“inalienable.”172 It is perhaps for this reason that law and economics scholars have
argued that the optimal occurrence level of intentional torts is zero.173 Likewise, “the

168

Implicit, then, in the moving bar approach is the idea that “reliability” under Rule 702
is a relative concept, a view that finds support in the Committee Notes to Rule 702. See FED.
R. EVID. 702, Committee Notes (2000) (describing the “factors relevant in determining
whether expert testimony is sufficiently reliable to be considered by the trier of fact”
(emphasis added)). This is not necessarily a new idea. See Nance, supra note 147, at 194
(“Reliability is inherently relative to a particular decision context, and thus relative to the goal
or purpose of decision.”); Imwinkelried, supra note 28, at 269 (“The question is not whether
the concept of reliability is a relative one. Rather, the issue is in which respects the concept is
relative.”). However, neither Professor Nance nor Professor Imwinkelried have previously
suggested that the height of the reliability bar should move in response to the nature of the
defendant’s tortious conduct.
169

RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 8A (1965).

170

See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, CASES AND MATERIALS ON TORTS 9 (7th ed. 2000) (noting
that §16 of the RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS, which addresses battery, approves of the
result in Vosburg, notwithstanding that the defendant in that case did not intend to cause
serious harm to the plaintiff and could not have been substantially certain that such serious
consequences would follow).
171
PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS 36 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed.
1984); see also Cleveland Park Club v. Perry, 165 A.2d 485 (D.C. Cir. 1960) (“[T]he intent
controlling is the intent to complete the physical act [that is in and of itself unlawful] and not
the intent to produce injurious consequences . . . .”).
172
See, e.g., Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and
Inalienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089, 1124–27 (1972).
173

WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF TORT LAW
153-56 (1987). Professor Coffee has argued that the law should never “price” intentional torts,
but should always “prohibit” them. John C. Coffee, Jr., Does “Unlawful” Mean “Criminal”?:
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danger of [damages awards] deterring socially valuable conduct . . . [is] minimized
and other policies come to the fore, such as making sure that the damages award is
an effective deterrent by resolving all doubts as to the plaintiff’s actual damages in
his favor . . . .”174 Thus, as Professor Malone recognized, traditionally “courts
‘seldom hesitate[d] to allow the jury a free range of speculation’ on the question of
cause-in-fact in [cases involving] intentional torts.”175 Accordingly, under a moving
bar approach to admissibility, the trial court’s ability to adjust the reliability bar
downward in order to ensure that uncertainties toward causation are resolved in the
plaintiff’s favor should be at its maximum in cases involving what Judge Posner calls
“real” intentional torts.176
Civil securities fraud claims regularly present difficult questions with respect to
the causal connection between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiffs’ damages,
and expert testimony is virtually always required for the plaintiffs to obtain a
damages award.177 A good example of the causation problems that such cases can

Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. REV.
193, 239 (1991).
174

Daniel P. Ryan, Proposed Punitive Damages in Michigan: A Microeconomic Analysis
of House Bill 5373, 1998 DET. C.L. REV. 197, 207 (1998); see also William M. Landes &
Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of International Torts, 1 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127,
136 (1981) (arguing that over-deterrence should be no concern with regards to intentional
torts); Amelia J. Toy, Statutory Punitive Damage Caps and the Profit Motive: An Economic
Perspective, 40 EMORY L.J. 303, 327 (1991) (“[S]ociety’s concern with intentional [torts] is
not that there will be less of the activity than desired (such is not possible), but that there will
instead be more of the activity than desired . . . .”).
175

Twerski & Sebok, supra note 163, at 1381 (quoting Malone, supra note 22, at 60).

176

Judge Posner describes “real” intentional torts as those that resemble common law
crimes and do not involve a conflict between legitimate and productive activities but rather a
coerced transfer of wealth to the defendant. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF
LAW 227 (5th ed. 1998). Other paradigmatic real intentional torts that routinely present
uncertainties as to the extent of damages include theft of trade secrets and possibly “hard core”
antitrust violations such as price fixing. See, e.g., Jon Chally, Note, The Law of Trade Secrets:
Toward a More Efficient Approach, 57 VAND. L. REV. 1269, 1295 n.113 (2004) (“Both in
form and in substance misappropriation of trade secrets should be treated as a ‘real’ intentional
tort. One who misappropriates a [trade] secret does not do so inadvertently while conducting
otherwise socially advantageous behavior.”); Robert H. Lande, Are Antitrust “Treble”
Damages Really Single Damages?, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 115, 116 (1993) (arguing that treble
damages, to compensate for detection problems, are at least appropriate in cases of “per se,
‘hard core’” offenses). The availability of treble damages is already a mechanism that
compensates for the problems that are posed by uncertainties as to the extent of damages.
177

See Behrens v. Wometco Enters., Inc., 118 F.R.D. 534, 542 (S.D. Fla. 1988) (“[P]roof
of damages in a securities fraud case is always difficult and requires expert testimony . . . .”).
Although this article has previously discussed experts testifying to causation, experts testifying
to the extent of damages are in the same genre and therefore can be treated similarly under the
moving bar approach. The primary difference between the two classes of experts is that the
exclusion of the former will usually sink a plaintiff’s case, whereas the exclusion of the latter
will only reduce the plaintiff’s potential recovery if liability is found.
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present, and how the “moving bar” approach might make a difference, is Kaufman v.
Motorola, Inc.178
Kaufman involved a class action brought by Motorola shareholders alleging that
Motorola executives had both concealed the true nature of Motorola’s inventory and
had made misleading public statements regarding the inventory in order to artificially
inflate the price of the stock.179 The class alleged that Motorola executives sold off
their shares at a profit after they publicly disclosed the problems with Motorola’s
inventory, resulting in a sharp stock decline.180 In order to establish the extent of its
damages, the class sought to admit the expert testimony of Dr. Gregg A. Jarrell, an
economics scholar and former chief economist of the Securities and Exchange
Commission. Dr. Jarrell was prepared to testify to the class’s aggregate, as opposed
to per share, damages, which he arrived at by “multiplying the alleged per share
price differential by the aggregate number of shares that were ‘damaged’ by the
alleged fraud.”181 In order to determine the aggregate number of shares that were
“damaged,” Dr. Jarrell used the so-called “proportional trading model.”182
According to Dr. Jarrell, the aggregate number of “damaged shares” could not be
ascertained without the use of modeling because some of the shares purchased
between the time of the fraudulent misstatements and the discovery thereof would
have been purchased by short traders and other specialists not included in the
plaintiff class.183
Motorola challenged Dr. Jarrell’s proposed testimony on the ground that the
proportional trading model was not sufficiently reliable under Daubert, and the trial
court agreed.184 Though stating that “[t]here is no question that Dr. Jarrell is a highly
qualified economist,” and that his “expertise was . . . clearly demonstrated to the
court by his cogent explanation of the proportional trading model and its application
to the facts of this case,”185 the court nevertheless determined that the model failed
Daubert:
At first blush, the conclusion that the proportional trading model does
not pass Daubert muster may appear to implicate the “flat earth” theory,
under which one could assume that the first person to conclude that the
world was round would have been considered heretically unscientific.
The difference, of course, is that the “round earth” theory was subject to
testing, and proven correct. Perhaps without such proof, the first person
to conclude that the world was round would not have been allowed to so

178
Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., No. 95 C 1069, 2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 14627 (N.D. Ill.
Sept. 21, 2000).
179

Id. at *4.

180

Id.

181

Id. at *3.

182

Id.

183

Id. at *4.

184

Id. at *2-*3, *6-*7.

185

Id. at *4-*5.
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testify before a jury if Daubert had been the law of what ever land that
person lived in.
In the instant case, Dr. Jarrell testified that there was no way to
actually test the reliability of the proportional trading model. Whether
this is correct or not, in absence of such testing and in absence of any
acceptance by the professional economists of the theory, it simply does
not pass Daubert muster.186
The court’s language makes its Daubert conclusion appear simple and virtually
ineluctable. However, the admissibility of statistical models for use in calculating
aggregate damages in securities fraud cases was, and still is, a “hot button issue,” and
several courts have allowed the use of such modeling to estimate aggregate class
damages.187 The proportional trading model was not remotely archetypal “junk
science,” and yet the trial court’s analysis suggests that it viewed the admissibility
question as a rather easy one.
The Kaufman court’s analysis is typical of the static bar approach because there
is not a hint of substantive tort policy considerations in the court’s analysis. The
outcome might have been different had a moving bar approach been employed: A
jury finding of fraud was a prerequisite to the imposition of compensatory damages,
and the optimal occurrence rate of such securities fraud is arguably zero.188 Thus,
concerns with potential over-deterrence should have been either reduced or nonexistent.189 Moreover, although deeming Dr. Jarrell inadmissible did not preclude
either liability or a damage award, it likely had a significant effect on the extent of

186

Id. at *6-*7.

187

See Richard Bemporad & I. Scott Bieler, Use of Experts in Securities Litigation, 1386
PLI/Corp 645 (2003) (collecting cases).
188
See, e.g., Paul G. Mohoney, Precaution Costs and the Law of Fraud in Impersonal
Markets, 78 VA. L. REV. 623, 647 (1992).
189

Whether private 10b-5 actions might pose over-deterrence risks is currently a matter of
scholarly debate and is beyond the scope of this paper. See, e.g., Amanda M. Rose, Reforming
Securities Litigation Reform: Restructuring the Relationship Between Public and Private
Enforcement of Rule 10b-5, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1301 (2008) (arguing that the threat of 10b-5
liability might overdeter issuers, who face strict liability for the frauds of their agents). More
broadly, excessive corporate liability for the actions of rogue employees might result in the
corporation adopting socially inefficient precautionary measures, such as preventative
monitoring of employees. See Coffee, supra note 173, at 196. In addition, one could argue
that the degree to which an actor is exposed to potential securities fraud penalties has an
inverse relationship to the actor’s willingness to provide even accurate securities-related
information to the public. The moving bar approach would, of course, allow a trial court to
take all of these things into consideration. As with many securities fraud cases, however, the
conduct at issue in Kaufman involved both scienter and the highest echelons of Motorola’s
management. See generally Kaufman v. Motorola, Inc., Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) P90, 481
(N.D. Ill. April 16, 1999). Both factors diminish any over-deterrence concern. See Coffee,
supra note 173, at 230 (arguing that where criminal behavior occurs within a corporation’s
senior levels, “then society should use penalties designed to prohibit, not price,” because “we
are again confronting behavior that lacks social utility, not the question how heavily to tax the
corporation in order to induce monitoring.”).
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the damages that Motorola would be forced to pay if found liable.190 For all of these
reasons, a moving bar approach might have counseled the trial court to relax its
demands on Dr. Jarrell, and it might have tipped the balance in the plaintiff’s favor.
B. Cases Involving Knowing Violations of Criminal or Regulatory Provisions that
Possibly have Resulted in Unintended Injuries to Unintended Victims
Cases involving intentional wrongdoing arguably present reduced or non-existent
concerns with over-deterrence. Under a moving bar approach, in such a case a trial
court might lower the reliability bar for a plaintiff’s expert’s proffer on causation.
Under the prevailing static bar approach, however, the fact that the defendant’s
potentially injurious conduct involved a knowing violation of a criminal statute or
regulatory provision is irrelevant to the reliability analysis.
Knowing and intentional violations of a discrete criminal statute or regulatory
provision thus provide another useful context in which to examine the difference
between the static bar and moving bar approaches.191 Although such conduct often
involves intentional harm, in many cases the causation question is with respect to
unintentional harm to unintended victims.192 Consider the case Dellinger v. Pfizer
Inc.193 Charles Dellinger underwent back surgery in 1994, and then again in 1996.194
After the second surgery, he complained to his physician that he was experiencing
extreme pain. His physician “told [him] about a new drug for pain management
which had come highly recommended.”195 The drug was Neurontin, an FDA
approved drug for the treatment of epilepsy. On September 19, 1996, Dellinger’s
physician prescribed Neurontin for the treatment of his pain, a use that was “offlabel.”196
Dellinger took Neurontin for the next eight months, at which point his physician
“took him off [the drug] because the medicine did not appear to be helping
[Dellinger’s] pain.”197 Dellinger was placed on another prescription drug, doxepin.
However, at the end of July 1997, Dellinger’s physician discontinued the doxepin

190

Without Dr. Jarrell’s testimony, the jury could only have been asked to find the amount
of “per share” damages. Class members would then have to file individual compensation
claims after the fact. Of course, it is unlikely that every class member would ultimately file
such a claim, either because of lack of knowledge or transaction costs. Thus, the
inadmissibility of Dr. Jarrell’s testimony almost certainly reduced Motorola’s exposure. That
is, the court’s admissibility decision gave Motorola a better chance of getting away with its
alleged fraud more cheaply.
191
Such violations are distinct from negligence per se, which does not require a showing
of specific intent.
192

Criminal dumping of chemical or other pollutants into a river or other water source is a
typical example.
193

Dellinger v. Pfizer Inc., No. 5:03CV95, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96355 (W.D.N.C. July
19, 2006).
194

Id. at *2.

195

Id.

196

Id. at *3.

197

Id. at *4.
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and re-prescribed Neurontin because Dellinger’s pain was worse. On August 27,
1997, Dellinger was also prescribed Duract as an additional pain medication, and in
late November 1997, he was also prescribed Prozac to counteract depression.198
In early 1998, Dellinger “began to experience severe lethargy, weakness,
malaise, nausea and a metallic taste in his mouth.”199 On March 18, 1998, Dellinger
was admitted to the Frye Regional Medical Center in Hickory, North Carolina,
where he was diagnosed with pneumonia. Dellinger’s medical records were
“unclear” as to whether he also had pancreatitis.200 “At the time . . . [Dellinger] was
taking Neurontin, Prozac, Soma, Vicodin, and Elavil.”201 Doctors took him off all of
his medication when he was admitted.202 The next day, Dellinger was placed in the
Intensive Care Unit (“ICU”) and the following day he was placed on a ventilator;
Dellinger remained on life support for the next two weeks.203
While Dellinger was in the ICU, his wife was “approached by Dr. Matt Brown . .
. who advised her that she should question the use of Neurontin by her husband . . .
.”204 On April 7th, Dellinger improved and was discharged from the ICU. He was
ultimately discharged from the hospital on April 23rd and discharged from his
rehabilitation facility on April 28th.205
Upon his discharge from the rehabilitation facility, Dellinger refused to continue
taking Neurontin, though he continued to take Vicodin, Prozac, and Elavil.206
Although his health gradually improved, it would be over a year before Dellinger
was “able to feed, bathe, and care for himself.”207
In 2003, Dellinger’s wife learned of reports that Pfizer and Parke-Davis, a
division of Pfizer’s subsidiary Warner-Lambert, “had developed a well-designed and
extensive scheme to promote Neurontin as an ‘off-label’ drug.”208 The scheme

198

Id. Dellinger’s physician discontinued the Duract in November 1997 because it caused
Dellinger bouts of diarrhea. Id. at *4 n.5.
199

Id. at *5.

200

Id.

201

Id.

202

Id.

203

Id.

204

Id. at *5-*6.

205

Id. at *6.

206

Id. at *6-*7.

207

Id. at *7.

208

Id. In 2004, Pfizer “agreed to pay [the government] more than $430 million to resolve
criminal charges and civil liabilities in connection with the promotion and marketing of
Neurontin,” and Warner-Lambert “plead guilty to two counts of violating the [Food, Drug, and
Cosmetics Act]” and paid a criminal fine of $240 million. Marc J. Scheineson & Shannon
Thyme Klinger, Lessons from Expanded Government Enforcement Efforts Against Drug
Companies, 60 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 1, 9 (2005). When Warner-Lambert’s criminal plea was
announced, the Department of Justice described the company’s scheme as a “widespread,
coordinated national effort to implement an off-label marketing plan” and stated that the
company
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included the hiring of “medical liaisons” who were “trained to use knowingly false
information about Neurontin’s ‘off-label’ uses when speaking with doctors and were
told to lie about their credentials.”209 Moreover, the liaisons “engaged in repetitive
distribution of non-scientific, anecdotal data designed to convince physicians that
‘off-label’ uses of Neurontin were safe and effective.”210
Dellinger subsequently sued Pfizer and Parke-Davis. Dellinger claimed (1) that
he would not have been prescribed Neurontin but for this illegal promotion of the
drug as a pain medication, and (2) that Neurontin caused the illness that resulted in
his being hospitalized for months and debilitated for over a year.211 The defendants
moved, inter alia, to exclude under Daubert the testimony of Dellinger’s expert that
Neurontin was the cause of his injuries.212
Dellinger’s causation expert was Christopher Keeys, a clinical pharmacist with a
degree in pharmacy.213 Dr. Keeys proposed “to testify that [Neurontin] was
‘probably the offending agent, and in the absence of medical etiologies, [the] cause
of [Dellinger’s] acute pancreatitis and subsequent complications . . . including [his]
respiratory illness.’”214
The trial court deemed Keeys’ testimony inadmissible. Although the court
deemed Keeys unqualified to speak to the question of causation because he lacked a
degree in pharmacology, the court alternatively determined that the substance of
Keeys’ opinion was not reliable “based upon the factors set out in Daubert,”215 thus
implying that Keeys’ opinion would have been inadmissible even if he had been a
pharmacologist.
Keeys had based his opinion on “product labels and data available from the
FDA’s adverse drug reaction reporting system . . . , published biomedical literature
related to drugs associated with acute pancreatitis, product inserts and additional data
regarding unpublished reports of acute pancreatitis, and a lack of positive rechallenge with reinstated medications in [Dellinger].”216 The trial court found
decided not to seek FDA approval for any of the [off-label] uses because it was
concerned that approval for any of the non-epilepsy uses would allow generic
competitors of Neurontin, which was expected to go off-patent soon, to compete with
a “son of Neurontin” drug that Warner-Lambert hoped to have approved by the FDA
for both epilepsy and non-epilepsy uses.
Department of Justice Release, Warner-Lambert to Pay $430 Million to Resolve Criminal &
Civil Health Care Liability Relating to Off-Label Promotion, (May 13, 2004) available at
www.usdoj.gov/opa/pr/2004/May/04_civ_322.htm
(noting
that
Warner-Lambert
“aggressively” promoted Neurontin for, inter alia, “the treatment of . . . various pain
disorders.”).
209

Dellinger, 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 96355, at *8.

210

Id.

211

Id. at *9-*10.

212

Id. at *25.

213

Id. at *25-*26.

214

Id. at *26 (quoting Plaintiff’s Exhibit F).

215

Id. at *28.

216

Id. at *29. The “lack of positive re-challenge” referred to the fact that Dellinger’s
health had improved after he ceased taking Neurontin. This allowed Keeys to “rule in”
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Keeys’ opinion failed Daubert’s test for reliability. The court held that the adverse
event reports had not been peer-reviewed and “fail[ed] to test a causal hypothesis.”217
As for Neurontin’s labeling and package insert, which listed pancreatitis as a
potential side effect, the court held that these were merely “regulatory document[s]
that [were] generated from science and a collaboration of the industry with the
FDA.”218 Because “Keeys’ opinion regarding the temporal relationship between
[Dellinger] taking Neurontin and becoming ill was never tested independently or by
objective sources,” the court held that his opinion that “Neurontin causes pancreatitis
[or pneumonia was] not supported by medical or scientific literature.”219
By the time that the Dellinger court ruled on the defendants’ Daubert challenge
of Keeys, Warner-Lambert already had pleaded guilty to multiple criminal violations
relating to its marketing of Neurontin.220 Indeed, the Dellinger court found that a
jury could have concluded that Dellinger would not have been prescribed Neurontin
as an off-label pain medication were it not for Warner-Lambert’s illegal scheme.221
Warner-Lambert’s illegal actions—which included providing false and misleading
information to doctors regarding Neurontin’s off-label efficacy222—exposed
Dellinger to dangerous side effects from an inappropriately prescribed drug, which is
precisely the type of harm that the federal off-label promotion statutes are in part
designed to protect patients against.
The defendants in Dellinger ostensibly made no attempt to demonstrate through
expert evidence that Neurontin was not capable of causing pancreatitis or
pneumonia. Thus, it is plain that the trial court based its decision on the view that
Dellinger’s expert had not established a sufficiently reliable basis for the conclusion
that there had been a causal connection in Dellinger’s case. In other words, though
there remained an uncertainty whether Neurontin was capable of causing Dellinger’s
injuries and whether it did in fact cause Dellinger’s injuries, the trial court did not
appear to relax at all Dellinger’s burden of resolving that uncertainty, even in light of
Warner-Lambert’s earlier admission of criminal misconduct. More generally,
Warner-Lambert’s underlying conduct did not even play a supporting role in the trial
court’s resolution of the admissibility question. The Dellinger court’s analysis was
thus an archetypal static bar approach.

Neurontin as the cause of Dellinger’s maladies while “ruling out” the other medications that
Dellinger continued to take. This is commonly referred to as “differential diagnosis” or
“differential etiology.” See, e.g., Westberry v. Gislaved Gummi AB, 178 F.3d 257, 262-63
(4th Cir. 1999) (“Differential diagnosis, or differential etiology, is a standard scientific
technique of identifying the cause of a medical problem by eliminating the likely causes until
the most probable one is isolated.”).
217

Dellinger, 2006 U.S. Dist. Lexis 96355, at *29.

218

Id. at *31.

219

Id. at *32, *34.

220

Id. at *9.

221

Id. at *23-*24.

222

Department of Justice Release, supra note 208 (“[Warner-Lamber]’s agents . . . made
false or misleading statements to health care professionals regarding Neurontin’s efficacy and
whether it had been approved by the FDA for the off-label uses.”).
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Now, to be sure, the criminal and civil penalties that Pfizer and Warner-Lambert
paid as part of its settlement with the Department of Justice in 2005 might have
represented a total disgorgement of the profits that the companies made through the
illegal marketing scheme for Neurontin. Thus, it could be argued that tort liability
for personal injuries that Neurontin might have caused to patients that would not
have received the drug but for the illegal marketing schemes are not necessary to
ensure optimal deterrence. However, this assumes that the government will obtain a
high, if not perfect, level of detection and enforcement of similar illegal marketing
schemes and that the public penalties will represent a full disgorgement. These
assumptions are probably not empirically sound.223
To the extent that Dellinger is typical of the decision that one could expect going
forward in similar cases, it skews a pharmaceutical company’s decision whether to
engage in illegal marketing schemes ex ante. Under Dellinger, where the causal
connection between adverse events and the drug are plausible but not yet proven
epidemiologically, the pharmaceutical company will not face liability for the
personal injury damages its illegal marketing may cause. Dellinger virtually ensures
that companies that engage in illegal marketing schemes will be able to avoid fully
internalizing the costs of the personal injuries that their schemes cause. Thus, if a
company faces only disgorgement of profits derived from the illegal scheme and not
the externalized injuries suffered by patients, it will undertake the scheme so long as
the probability of full disgorgement is less than one,224 even though the social cost of
its scheme exceeds its ill-gotten gains.225
It might be argued that whether Dellinger results in economically inefficient
under-deterrence of violations of the off-label promotion statutes depends on
whether those statutes themselves are economically efficient.226 Alternatively, it
might be argued that the knowing evasion of a legislatively-enacted statute
(particularly one designed to ensure public safety) always or presumptively lacks
social utility and that therefore over-deterrence of such knowing evasions should not
be a concern.227 Whichever view is taken, the important point is that a moving bar

223

See George S. Craft, Jr., Note, Promoting Off-Label in Pursuit of Profit: An
Examination of a Fraudulent Business Model, 8 HOUS. J. HEALTH L. & POL’Y 103, 122 (2007)
(“[T]he overall financial gains resulting from [the illegal marketing of Neurontin] . . .
dwarf[ed] the $430 million global settlement.”).
224

Cf. RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 223 (1976).

225

In the case of Neurontin, the evidence was strong that the drug was responsible for at
least some of the occurrences of pneumonia in patients using the drug. In fact, based on
adverse event data from all Neurontin clinical trials, pneumonia already had been identified as
a “frequent” adverse event experienced in patients taking the drug. See FDA Approved
Labeling Text, February 2005, www.fda.gov/medWatch/SAFETY/2005/Feb_PI/Neurontin
_PI.pdf (last visited Aug. 31, 2008).
226

This is a topic that is beyond the scope of this Article.

227
Warner-Lambert’s violation of the off-label promotion statutes with regard to
Neurontin was not only knowing, but it was also accompanied by the feeding of knowingly
false and misleading information to doctors who prescribed the drugs to their patients. This
type of statutory violation is less likely to serve any social utility. Cf. David A. Barker,
Environmental Crimes, Prosecutorial Discretion, and the Civil/Criminal Line, 88 VA. L. REV.
1387, 1426-28 (2002) (arguing that criminal enforcement should “focus on the violator who
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approach would have allowed the trial court in Dellinger to consider whether the
illegal nature of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct militates in favor of a
lower reliability bar for the plaintiff’s causation expert because concerns with overdeterrence are reduced. That is, the trial court would have been allowed to determine
that, in light of the nature of the defendant’s possibly injurious conduct, erring on the
side of potential excessive liability228 made more sense than erring on the side of
under-deterrence, and therefore Dellinger’s expert would have been scrutinized a bit
less at the admissibility stage.229 In Dellinger, this might have made the difference
between the plaintiff losing at summary judgment or, instead, surviving the
defendant’s Daubert challenge and getting to the jury.
C. Cases Involving Injuries Possibly Causally Connected to Consumer Products
that Possess Questionable Social Utility
This subsection discusses the use of a moving bar approach to adjust the
reliability bar downward and the likelihood that it will become more controversial
and tricky: cases involving injuries possibly causally connected to consumer
products that possess questionable social utility. In the context of pharmaceuticals,
Professors Berger and Twerski have referred to such products as “lifestyle drugs,”
defined by the fact that they offer “little therapeutic value.”230
misleads the government and undermines the regulatory system through fraud, deception, or
denial”).
228
By “excessive liability” the author means liability that exceeds the probabilistic harm
that the defendant’s conduct caused. For example, suppose that Neurontin caused a 20%
increase in the occurrence of pneumonia among patients who were inappropriately prescribed
the drug as a result of Warner-Lambert’s illegal marketing scheme. Suppose further that every
one of these patients sued Warner-Lambert and that juries ultimately found in favor of 50% of
them. If this occurred, then Warner-Lambert’s damages would be 2.5 times the probabilistic
harm for which it was responsible.
229

Adjusting the reliability bar downward in Dellinger seems intuitively correct from the
perspective of fairness as well. Warner-Lambert’s underlying conduct was not merely
violative of the off-label promotion statutes; its conduct interfered with the relationship
between Dellinger and his physician. Warner-Lambert’s conduct was thus wrongful vis-à-vis
Dellinger even if Neurontin was not the cause of Dellinger’s physical injuries. When viewed
in this way, Dellinger’s personal injury lawsuit against Pfizer presented solely a question of
the extent of the damages Dellinger suffered as a result of Warner-Lambert’s illegal scheme.
“The most elementary conceptions of justice and public policy require that the wrongdoer
shall bear the risk of the uncertainty which his own wrong has created.” Bigelow v. RKO
Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251, 265 (1946) (calling the principle “an ancient one”).
230
Berger & Twerski, supra note 130, at 268. I do not agree with Professor Berger’s and
Professor Twerski’s characterization of certain products as “lifestyle drugs.” For instance,
their categorization of Bendectin as a lifestyle drug ignores the fact that morning sickness can
often pose a serious risk to fetal health. See University of Illinois Medical Center: Health
Library, Morning Sickness, http://uimc.discoveryhospital.com/main.php?id=2064 (last visited
Aug. 31, 2008) (“Prolonged morning sickness can cause weight loss, dehydration, salt
imbalances, and malnutrition. If these are not treated, they can lead to liver, kidney, heart, and
brain damage to the mother and the fetus . . . . Severe morning sickness, or hyperemesis
gravidarum, can cause low birth weight and fetal growth retardation. The blood flow to the
placenta and fetus is also decreased[.] Less oxygen and nutrients are delivered to the baby.
Low birth weight is often linked with poorer mental function and reduced overall health of the
baby.”).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2009

39

618

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 57:579

One reason that a moving bar approach is likely to be more controversial and
more tricky in this context is because it can be difficult to distinguish between
consumer products with high social utility and those whose social utility is low or
perhaps even non-existent. However, it seems obvious that certain products offer
more potential benefits than others. For example, a vaccine that guards effectively
against a serious virus seems clearly to possess greater social utility than an
unregulated dietary supplement that claims to increase metabolism. Assume that the
vaccine has a social value of $100 per inoculation, while the dietary supplement has
a social value of $1 per person who takes it. If both products carry a one percent risk
of causing a harm of $200, from an economic perspective the vaccine is net efficient
($98 net value per inoculation) while the dietary supplement is net inefficient (-$1
net value per person who takes it).
A regulator seeking economic efficiency would prohibit sales of the dietary
supplement, but not the vaccine despite the fact that the two products pose the exact
same risk of harm.231 But, for a variety of reasons, oftentimes ex ante regulatory
decisions do not achieve economic efficiency, and risk-causing behavior is
sometimes unregulated or under-regulated.232 This is where the tort system steps in.
The “all-or-nothing, more probable than not” standard hampers the tort system’s
ability to achieve optimal deterrence, however.233 Comparing an important vaccine
with an unregulated dietary supplement that offers minimal appreciable health
benefits is again a useful exercise. Suppose that in a given population 100 people are
expected to suffer from disease X, which causes each afflicted person a loss of $200.
Suppose further that both a highly effective vaccine against H1N1 influenza and an
objectively valueless (but creatively marketed), unregulated dietary supplement are
both associated with a one percent increase in this background rate of disease X.
Finally, suppose that for both the vaccine and the supplement the evidence of the
causal connection to disease X is of the same quality and quantity.
In a lawsuit against either the manufacturer of the vaccine or the dietary
supplement, the plaintiff suffering from disease X will have the burden to show that
it is more probable than not that the defendant’s product caused his disease. The
plaintiff will need to introduce an expert willing to testify to this. For the plaintiff to
withstand summary judgment, he or she will have to first withstand the defendant’s
Daubert challenge. The defendant’s challenge will predictably argue that the
expert’s causation opinion is inherently unreliable given that the defendant’s product
is associated only with a paltry one percent increase in the background disease rate.

231

In a perfect functioning market, regulation would not be necessary. Instead, rational
consumers would choose to avoid the dietary supplement. However, information asymmetries
and other market failures militate against such a free market approach. See generally Jon D.
Hanson & Douglas A. Kysar, Taking Behavioralism Seriously: Some Evidence of Market
Manipulation, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1420 (1999). Even a perfect Pigovian tax requires
consumers to accurately assess the utility of a product in order for the market to order
consumer choices perfectly.
232
See Wendy E. Wagner, Choosing Ignorance in the Manufacture of Toxic Products, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 773, 840 n.247 (1997) (reviewing briefly scholarship addressing causes of
regulatory failure in the context of mass torts).
233

See generally Rosenberg, supra note 109.
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If the trial court excludes the plaintiff’s expert, then the defendant will escape all
liability even though there is a probabilistic harm of $2 associated with its product
(.01 multiplied by $200). If, however, the trial court were to admit the evidence and
allow the plaintiff to get to the jury, the defendant potentially could face liability of
$200 for each of the 101 plaintiffs who took the defendant’s product and
subsequently were diagnosed with disease X. Even if juries found for the plaintiff
only ten percent of the time, the manufacturers of the products would be faced with
liability far exceeding the probabilistic harm of their products.
Under the “all-or-nothing” liability rule, a trial court deciding whether to exclude
the evidence and dismiss the case on the one hand, or to admit the expert evidence
and send the case to the jury on the other, has a choice: Err on the side of underdeterrence (exclude and dismiss despite probabilistic harm of $2) or err on the side
of over-deterrence by exposing the defendant to potential “crushing liability” 234 of
$200. There is simply no way around this.
The moving bar approach counsels that, in making its admissibility
determination, the trial court should not decide between under- or over-deterrence in
a vacuum. Rather, it should consider the nature of the defendant’s potentially
injurious conduct. In the disease X hypothetical described above, assuming that the
defendant did not mislead consumers, violate any regulatory provisions, or otherwise
act fraudulently in selling its product, the court should consider the social utility of
the defendant’s product. The court should lower the reliability bar in the lawsuit
against the dietary supplement manufacturer and use a substantially higher bar in a
lawsuit against the vaccine manufacturer. It is easy to see why: The probabilistic
harm of the dietary supplement is $2 (.01 multiplied by $200), the social utility of the
product is $0. Exposing the manufacturer of the dietary supplement to excessive tort
liability does not result in inefficient over-deterrence.235 With the vaccine, on the
other hand, the product is clearly net socially efficient. Accordingly, ensuring that
the manufacturer does not face excessive liability is a critical concern. Although
precluding any tort recovery against the manufacturer of the vaccine would allow the
manufacturer to avoid internalizing the probabilistic harm that its product causes
($2), the negative consequences of this are far outweighed by the negative
consequences that excessive liability might cause, namely, the removal of the
vaccine from the market. Moreover, if a court admitted the causation evidence
against the vaccine manufacturer, it would send a signal to manufacturers of similar
products with possible harmful side effects that they might also face crushing
liability. Such manufacturers may withdraw their products from the market (or never
bring them to market in the first place) despite the fact that the benefits outweigh the
probabilistic harms associated with them.236

234
By “crushing liability,” the author means liability that greatly exceeds the probabilistic
harm caused by the conduct in question.
235
Although plaintiffs would stand to gain a windfall, there is no concern with overdeterring the manufacturer of the dietary supplement because the product already is socially
inefficient.
236
This essentially is what happened with Bendectin, the drug at issue in Daubert, as well
as the DPT vaccine. See W. Kip Viscusi, Corporate Risk Analysis: A Reckless Act?, 52 STAN.
L. REV. 547, 584 (2000).
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Few cases will be as straightforward as the stylized disease X hypothetical above.
For example, if the dietary supplement created $5 in additional social value for each
person who took it, then the product would be net socially efficient (assuming it was
not associated with harms other than disease X, of course). What if the court is not
sure of the supplement’s per-use social value but thinks it is between $1 and $5—
should the court err on the side of over-deterrence or under-deterrence? It is not the
intent of this Article to provide answers to questions such as these. Rather, it is
enough to point out that a court focused on economic deficiency might find it
appropriate to lower the reliability bar in cases involving products with less social
utility and raise it in cases involving products with greater social utility.
This is not what courts are doing under the Daubert/Joiner mode of analysis,
however. The case Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc.,237 involved a products liability
suit against the manufacturer of diet pills containing fenfluramine-phentermine,
(“fen-phen”). In Linnen, the decedent died of primary pulmonary hypertension
(PPH) at age 30. The decedent had been diagnosed with PPH shortly after taking the
defendant’s diet pills for a period of three weeks.238 The defendant argued in several
pre-trial motions that there was no evidence linking the ingredients contained in its
diet pills to PPH.239
The plaintiff, however, sought to introduce the testimony of Dr. Paul Wellman to
prove causation.240 Dr. Wellman was “a Professor of Psychology at Texas A & M
University . . . who [had studied] the pharmacological and neurochemical bases of
anorexia induced by appetite suppressant drugs. [He had] lectured and published on
neurochemical and pharmacological mechanisms by which appetite suppressants
reduce eating in animals.”241 Dr. Wellman testified that, in his expert opinion, the
diet pills taken by the decedent had caused or contributed to the development of her
PPH. He based his opinion on the following: First, clinical case studies collectively
suggested an association between ingestion of fen-phen and PPH. Second, appetite
suppressants with chemical structures similar to the defendant’s diet pills have been
shown to increase serotonin levels, and increased serotonin levels have been shown
to cause or be “likely risk factors of” PPH.242
Dr. Wellman also “relie[d] on a variety of materials, including case reports [of
adverse events], studies of other drugs that are pharmacologically related to
phentermine, studies of the physiological effects of serotonin on animals, and an
article he co-authored with Dr. Timothy Maher of the Massachusetts College of
Pharmacy and Health Sciences” that was peer-reviewed and “published in the
International Journal of Obesity in 1999.”243

237
Linnen v. A.H. Robins Co., Inc., No. CIV. A. 97-2307, 2000 WL 16769 (Mass. Super.
Dec. 14, 1999).
238

Id. at *1.

239

Id. at *6.

240

See generally id.

241

Id. at *1.

242

Id. at *2.

243

Id. at *2-*3.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol57/iss3/7

42

2009]

A “MOVING BAR” APPROACH

621

Reviewing Dr. Wellman’s expert opinion atomistically, the court held that it was
unreliable and inadmissible. The court first concluded that Dr. Wellman’s reliance
on the adverse event case reports was not scientifically reliable:
Case reports cannot be relied upon to establish association or causation
between exposure and disease because they do not include control groups.
The absence of a control group makes it impossible to determine whether
the occurrence of the disease in a reported individual is attributable to the
exposure or whether it would have occurred in the individual even absent
the exposure.244
With regard to the scientific studies showing that fen-phen caused an increase in
serotonin levels, the court noted that Dr. Wellman had relied on animal studies in
forming this conclusion. These animal studies involved mice that were given doses
of phentermine well above the dosage level given to humans.245 Quoting the
defendant’s expert’s critique of Dr. Wellman’s opinion, the court stated, “animal
studies have limited applicability to humans due to important differences between
animals and humans, including differences in the bodies’ reactions to a drug.”246 The
court also rejected the reliability of Dr. Wellman’s assumption that increased
serotonin levels are a risk factor of PPH. The court agreed with the defendant’s
expert that it is improper to rely on theories about the biological mechanism by
which a disease is triggered when no epidemiological studies support the
hypothesis.247
Ultimately, the court held that Dr. Wellman’s testimony was unreliable and
inadmissible under Daubert. The fact that a peer-reviewed journal had earlier
published a paper that Dr. Wellman authored proposing the existence of a link
between PPH and fen-phen was not enough to save Dr. Wellman’s opinion.248 The
court held that the lack of sufficient testing of Dr. Wellman’s theory, its failure to
obtain general acceptance of the theory in the scientific community, and Dr.
Wellman’s heavy reliance on animal studies was fatal to his opinion’s admissibility.
In a telling passage, the court summarized its criticism of Dr. Wellman’s testimony
by pointing to the differences between legal certainty and scientific certainty:
Dr. Wellman acknowledges that he holds certain critical opinions in this
case with less than a reasonable degree of scientific certainty. Those
opinions include whether phentermine causes primary pulmonary
hypertension, whether phentermine in combination with fenfluramine
increases the risk of developing pulmonary hypertension, whether an
increase in seratonin levels causes pulmonary hypertension, and whether
phentermine alone increases seratonin levels.

244

Id. at *3 (quoting defendant’s expert).

245

Id. at *3-*4.

246

Id. at *5 (quoting defendant’s expert).

247

Id. at *11.

248

See id. at *5.
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The parties agree that an expert should be able to testify “to a reasonable
degree of scientific certainty,” but they dispute what constitutes that level
of certainty. Plaintiffs urge that, because this is a civil trial, the standard
for the admissibility of expert testimony should be the civil standard of
proof, variously expressed by plaintiffs as a preponderance of the
evidence, more likely than not, or, expressed numerically, 51% . . . .
....
. . . When a witness testifies as to the principles and methodologies
applicable to a particular scientific field—what might be termed pure
science—that witness must testify with reasonable scientific certainty.
Reliability under the rationale of . . . Daubert requires no less before
potentially critical expert testimony may come before the jury . . . .
. . . Although an expert’s opinion as to the application of science to the
facts of a case may be offered on the basis of probability, reasonableness
and likelihood, the scientific principles or knowledge on which those
opinions are based must be held with a reasonable degree of scientific
certainty. That level of certainty, while it need not be absolute, must be
greater than “more likely than not.”249
The Linnen court’s analysis is, again, an archetypal static bar approach. Nothing
in the opinion remotely suggests that the court treated the height of the reliability bar
as being any different than it would have been had the drug at issue been an FDAapproved drug designed to treat serious illness.250 As suggested earlier in this
subsection, this makes little sense from a deterrence perspective. If the tort system is
intended to further “society’s task [of selecting] those drugs with net beneficial
health effects,”251 then a court’s reliability analysis should be altered to more
resemble a regulatory risk assessment. This is what the moving bar approach tries to
move toward.252
V. CONCLUSION: SOME OBJECTIONS TO THE MOVING BAR APPROACH
The author is under no illusions that the moving bar approach proposed is likely
to raise a host of objections. In this concluding section, the author offers brief
responses to a few of the objections that might be raised:

249

Id. at *12-*14.

250

The defendant’s product was neither FDA-approved nor designed as an obesity
treatment. Most users of the product turned to it in order to lose “those last few pounds.” See
Michael D. Lemonick, Dark Side of Diet Pills: Growing Reports of Serious Side Effects are
Leading to Tough New Restrictions on Redux and Fen-Phen, TIME, Sept. 22, 1997, at 81.
251

Viscusi, supra note 236, at 585.

252

While this article has focused on circumstances in which the moving bar approach
would counsel a trial court to adjust the reliability bar downward, in some cases it will counsel
a court to raise the reliability bar even higher than Daubert purports to set it.
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Objection #1: The moving bar approach has no support in the plain language of
Rule 702.
This objection is based upon a cramped reading of Rule 702. Rule 702 provides:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the
trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
[qualified witness] may testify thereto in the form of an opinion or
otherwise, if (1) the testimony is based upon sufficient facts or data, (2)
the testimony is the product of reliable principles and methods, and (3) the
witness has applied the principles and methods reliably to the facts of the
case.253
The rule’s focus on the “sufficiency” of the facts or data, and the “reliability” of the
witness’s principles and methods and application thereof to the facts of the case do
not foreclose a moving bar approach. Rule 702’s key terms are “sufficient” and
“reliable.” These are relativistic terms,254 and they have been treated as such in other
legal contexts.255
The question, of course, is what factors to which the terms “sufficient” and
“reliable” are relative. Traditionally, courts deciding whether to allow a plaintiff to
get to the jury demanded less evidence of a causal connection between defendant’s
conduct and the plaintiff’s injury in cases where the defendant’s conduct was more
reprehensible or otherwise warranted less protection from over-deterrence.256 In
other words, in determining whether evidence was “sufficient” to get the plaintiff to
the jury, the trial court took into account the nature of the defendant’s possibly
injurious conduct. The moving bar approach simply incorporates this well known
practice into the admissibility stage: A “reliable” opinion is one that, if accepted by
jurors, would result in an outcome that could be deemed an “acceptable” outcome
from the perspective of, inter alia, optimal deterrence.257

253

FED. R. EVID. 702.

254

See Imwinkelried, supra note 28, at 269-70.

255

For example, an anonymous witness’s tip may be deemed sufficiently reliable to justify
a Terry stop, but not sufficiently reliable to procure a search warrant. See Katherine
Goldwasser, After Abscam: An Examination of Congressional Proposals to Limit Targeting
Discretion in Federal Undercover Investigations, 36 EMORY L.J. 75, 134 (1987) (“[T]he test
for reliability of informant information is more demanding under the probable cause standard
than under the reasonable suspicion standard.”).
256

See supra text accompanying notes 20-21.

257

I do think that Rule 702’s plain language forecloses any approach to admissibility that
would throw science out the window completely. For example, no matter how reprehensible
the defendant’s conduct, I do not think that Rule 702 would remotely contemplate letting a
causation expert base her testimony on a Ouija board or a crystal ball. At a minimum, I think
Rule 702 would require that an expert’s methodology be consistent with the methodology that
a regulatory risk-assessor would use, and that an expert should rely on the types of evidence
upon which a regulatory risk-assessor would rely.
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Objection #2: The moving bar approach inappropriately allows courts to engage in
policymaking that should be reserved for regulatory agencies.
Concededly, the moving bar approach assumes not only that the courts have
some role in regulating activities that pose risks, but also that their decision-making
processes should be sensitive to substantive tort policies such as deterrence.258 There
is an ongoing debate whether regulatory policy-making is a task that should be left
exclusively to legislatures and administrative agencies.259 Entering this debate is
beyond the scope of this Article, but there are a couple of points that are worth
making in summary form.
First, commentators who object to courts engaging in regulatory policy-making
argue that courts are neither electorally accountable nor particularly transparent.260
However, most regulatory decisions are ultimately made by administrative agencies,
as opposed to the legislature, and it is questionable whether administrative agencies
are either significantly more democratically responsive or significantly more
transparent than courts. “[T]he political pressures on an agency will not necessarily
reflect society’s preferences,” which tends to dilute its democratic responsiveness.261
Commentators have also recognized that agencies are uniquely vulnerable to interest
group capture, which tends to negate the benefits of agency expertise.262 Moreover,
although a federal agency must allow “interested persons” the opportunity to
comment on a proposed rule263 and must base its final decision on “substantial
evidence” and justify the decision in writing,264 courts also allow (albeit in a more
258
Certain steps could be taken to minimize the degree that courts make policy under the
moving bar approach. For example, if the nature of the defendant’s conduct was simply
treated as a “thumb on the scale” in an otherwise close case, then the moving bar approach
would not give a court extreme policy-making authority.
259
See Charles J. Doane, Beyond Fear: Articulating a Modern Doctrine in Anticipatory
Nuisance for Enjoining Improbable Threats of Catastrophic Harm, 17 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L.
REV. 441, 447-48 (1990) (“Commentators and scholars have debated at some length on
whether courts should play an active role in the regulation of modern technological risk . . . .
These writers believe regulation of modern technological risks should be left largely to
administrative agencies . . . . Meanwhile, those in favor of an increased judicial role question
whether administrative agencies are sensitive enough to the public interest in regulating such
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limited fashion) interested persons to participate in the judicial process through amici
filings. Furthermore, the most important judicial decisions are accompanied by a
detailed written opinion.
Second, the administrative rule-making process tends to take years. This is
particularly true with respect to complex yet broadly important issues, such as
whether a particular food or drug should be banned due to safety concerns. Consider
the FDA’s ban of ephedrine and ephedra-containing dietary supplements. The
FDA’s decision-making process began in June 1997. It was not until December 30,
2003 that the FDA issued its initial decision to ban ephedra, and it took until
February 11, 2004 for the agency to issue its final rule.265 During this nearly seven
year rule-making process, ephedra manufacturers engaged in a “fierce lobbying”
effort, and at least one commentator has described the FDA as having “been
extraordinarily slow in instituting the ban . . . .”266 Even if agencies do have an
advantage over courts when it comes to regulatory expertise, this does not do much
good if proposed regulations languish for years. To the extent that speed in reducing
potentially harmful behavior is important, arguably the judicial system is superior to
agency rule-making.
Third, while the threat of tort liability has the capacity to deter broadly, agency
regulations have only the power to constrain narrowly. To return to the ephedra
example, the FDA’s ban on ephedra did not truly solve the public health problem
that the agency was confronting. Rather, manufacturers simply began to create and
sell new products with ephedra-like effects (and ephedra-like dangers) that were not
captured by the ephedra ban.267 The proposed moving bar approach would not be so
easily evaded.
Finally, while the proposed moving bar approach provides courts a role in the
regulatory decision-making process, it does not provide courts with anything close to
the equivalent of an administrative agency’s regulatory prerogative. Indeed, in those
instances where it eases the burden of admissibility, the moving bar approach
actually transfers power from the court to the jury.
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Objection #3: The moving bar approach will lead to an across-the-board watering
down of the reliability standard.
This objection gets it backwards. A static bar approach is more likely to result in
an across-the-board watering down of the reliability standard. It is plausible that
courts confronted with sympathetic plaintiffs, such as those injured as a result of
reprehensible conduct or by consumer products of questionable social utility,
eventually will feel pressure to allow plaintiff’s with shaky causation evidence to
present their cases to the jury. Under a static bar approach, if courts begin to lower
the reliability bar for these sympathetic plaintiffs, they will necessarily have
suggested a lower bar in all cases.
Under a moving bar approach, courts would have case-specific, idiosyncratic
reasons for their particular admissibility decisions. So, for example, in a case
involving fen-phen, a court could admit an expert proffer based on animal studies
without suggesting that reliance on animal studies would be sufficient in a case
involving a valuable vaccine.
In addition, a moving bar approach will in some cases warrant an even higher
reliability bar. Thus, the moving bar approach is not inherently “pro-plaintiff.”
Rather, the approach seeks to move the tort system toward optimal deterrence in
spite of an “all-or-nothing” rule that is in inherent tension with optimal deterrence.
Objection #4: The moving bar approach will create windfalls for undeserving
plaintiffs.
Under a moving bar approach, some indeterminate plaintiffs will get to the jury
when they would not have under a static bar approach. And, some of these plaintiffs
likely will receive compensation that exceeds the probabilistic harm caused by the
defendant, which could be categorized as a windfall. However, it is important to
note that surviving a Daubert challenge and summary judgment does not mean that
the plaintiff will prevail at trial. Even in the most sympathetic of cases, plaintiffs
with shaky causation evidence lose. For example, in the Bendectin litigation, where
the causation evidence was always quite weak, nearly sixty percent of juries ruled in
favor of Merrell Dow.268 More recently, in the products liability litigation against
Vioxx, which involved evidence of corporate wrong-doing on the part of Merck &
Co., Inc., juries ruled in favor of plaintiffs in only fifty percent of cases.269
Admitting expert evidence will therefore merely force the parties to the
bargaining table. Surviving a Daubert motion will obviously increase the settlement
value of the plaintiff’s case from what it was prior to the Daubert hearing value.
But, the settlement value will still have to take into account the possibility that the
evidence, while good enough to be admitted, will not be good enough to persuade a
jury.270 Ultimately, the valuation landscape may result in settlements that move
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toward an accurate reflection of the statistical probability of a causal connection
between the defendant’s conduct and the plaintiff’s injuries.
In the end, the moving bar approach is an attempt to ease some of the existing
tension between the substantive tort policy of deterrence and the manner in which
modern courts tend to evaluate the reliability of expert evidence. This Article
represents merely an opening in a renewed debate over how substantive tort policies
can be integrated into the law of expert evidence.

begun to create a valuation landscape, and thus to provide a basis for negotiating
settlements.”).
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